Problems about corporate moral personhood

Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (4):327-333 (1985)
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Abstract

According to peter french, A corporation can be construed as a moral person in the same sense that you and I are persons. Whether this view is tenable is an open question. I examine the objections to this view made in the recent literature and find them wanting. I deal with the questions whether corporations can have intentions, Rights, And consciousness

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
The Corporation as a Moral Person.Peter A. French - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):207 - 215.

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