Kopeikin (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Rachels’ (1975) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is no different than letting die. Hill’s (2018) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is worse than letting die. At least one of the intuitions must be mistaken. This calls for an error theory. Hill has an error theory for the intuition elicited by the Kopeikin/Rachels’ cases. Kopeikin and Rachels have an error theory for the intuition elicited by Hill’s cases. A natural thought is (...) that we are at an impasse. There is no plausible basis for preferring one error theory to the other. I argue that this natural thought is mistaken. Not all error theories are equal. Preliminary considerations favor Hill’s error theory and disfavor the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory. But preliminary considerations are not decisive. The way forward in the bare-difference debate is not to evaluate intuitions. The intuitions are in. What is left to do now is evaluate the comparative status of the Hill and the Kopeikin/Rachels error theories. (shrink)

In lieu of Abstract: With inequality of various sorts ballooning worldwide, a critique of democracy has come of age, and a change of political ethos is underway. Against this background, the critique of democracy becomes not only possible but also popular, and examples in China and many Western democracies abound. It is no exaggeration to say, in this context, that sufficient momentum has gathered to qualify the situation as "democratic recession," despite people may have different understandings as to the exact (...) nature of this recession and how long it will last. Accompanying this recession, Confucian political meritocracy, whose aim is to correct the wrongs of democracy, is constructed as an alternative to liberal democracy. Many argue that the end of history is not nigh but will continue in and by Confucian political meritocracy... (shrink)

It is often thought that desire-based versions of reasons internalism, according to which our practical reasons depend on what we desire, are committed to denying that we have any categorical reasons. I shall argue, however, that such theories are committed to a universal desire which gives rise to an unexpected categorical reason – a reason to know our surroundings. I will arrive at this conclusion by using Fichte’s argument for thinking that security from unpredictable and powerful forces of nature is (...) constitutive of agency. Fichte thinks this is the case because we ought to aim at knowledge of our surroundings, and such environments uniquely facilitate it. I show that his argument fails, but the point that we ought to aim at – or desire – such knowledge is fundamentally sound. This aim can then be leveraged to generate a categorical reason when embedded in an account of agency typically embraced by internalists. (shrink)

In a recent paper in JVI, ‘An Anarchist Interpretation of Marx’s “Ability to Needs” Principle,’ Spafford has argued that: (i) the communist and anarchist traditions share an objection to a particular kind of exchange (which he calls quid pro quo exchange); (ii) the anarchist objection to quid pro quo exchange can be understood as opposition to conditional exchange; (iii) consequently, the objection motivates an opposition to conditional exchange as such (i.e. a commitment to unconditional exchange); and (iv) we can construct (...) a normative justification of this opposition by reference to the value of freedom, given that conditional exchange offers diminish the freedom of the recipients of the offers. In this reply piece I argue that (ii) is importantly mistaken, and that consequently (iii) also fails. Although all quid pro quo exchanges are conditional exchanges, the converse does not hold, and we have reason to believe that there will be instances of conditional exchange that are unobjectionable by the lights of the traditional anarchist and communist objection to such exchange. Consequently, an opposition to all conditional exchange rules out too much. However, I will argue that a suitably modified version of (iv) may nevertheless survive the counterexamples that defeat (ii). (shrink)

The idea of using artificial intelligence as a support system in the sentencing process has attracted increasing attention. For instance, it has been suggested that machine learning algorithms may help in curbing problems concerning inter-judge sentencing disparity. The purpose of the present article is to examine the merits of this possibility. It is argued that, insofar as the unfairness of sentencing disparity is held to reflect a retributivist view of proportionality, it is not necessarily the case that increasing inter-judge uniformity (...) in sentencing is desirable. More generally, it is shown that the idea of introducing machine learning algorithms, that produce sentencing predictions on the ground of a dataset that is built of previous sentencing decisions, faces serious problems if there exists a discrepancy between actual sentencing practice and the sentences that are ideally desirable. (shrink)

In his 1972 paper “A Short Refutation Ethical Egoism,” Richmond Campbell purports to refute ethical egoism via a simple reductio. Although his argument has received critical attention, it has not been satisfactorily answered. In this paper I answer it, for reasons that go well beyond my immediate topic. Campbell’s argument calls for an answer partly because, as I show, if it succeeds against ethical egoism, then variations of it refute many other normative ethical theories, such as act utilitarianism.

Are the limits on what we can do, morally speaking—our “moral incapacities” as Bernard Williams calls them—imposed on us from within, by reason itself, or from without, by something other than reason? Do they perhaps have their source in the will, as opposed to reason? In this essay, I argue for a theory of moral incapacity on which our moral incapacities have their source in reason itself. The theory is defended on the grounds that it provides the best explanation of (...) our knowledge of our own moral incapacities. I argue that just as an agent’s reflective commitments play an essential role in the explanation of their knowledge of their moral incapacities, they play an essential role in the explanation of moral incapacities themselves. Since reflective commitments are rational commitments, and rational commitments have their source in reason, moral incapacities have their source in reason itself. The theory of knowledge of moral incapacity offered in this essay draws on elements of Richard Moran’s “deliberative” theory of self-knowledge and elements of that theory are used to offer a theory of moral incapacities which extends and improves on Bernard Williams’ “deliberative” theory of moral incapacities. The resulting theory is then defended against objections and alternatives. (shrink)

It may be a myth that Plato wrote over the entrance to the Academy “Let no-one ignorant of geometry enter here.” But it is a well-chosen motto for his view in the Republic that mathematical training is especially productive of understanding in abstract realms, notably ethics. That view is sound and we should return to it. Ethical theory has been bedevilled by the idea that ethics is fundamentally about actions (right and wrong, rights, duties, virtues, dilemmas and so on). That (...) is an error like the one Plato mentions of thinking mathematics is about actions (of adding, constructing, extracting roots and so on). Mathematics is about eternal relations between universals, such as the ratio of the diagonal of a square to the side. Ethics too is about eternal verities, such as the equal worth of persons and just distributions. Mathematical and ethical verities do both constrain actions, such as the possibility of walking over the seven bridges of Königsberg once and once only or of justly discriminating between races. But they are not themselves about action. In principle, neither mathematical nor ethical verities are subject to historical forces or disagreement among tribes (though they can be better understood as time goes on). Plato is right: immersion in mathematics induces an understanding of the necessities underpinning reality, an understanding that is essential for distinguishing objective ethics from tribal custom. Equality, for example, is an abstract concept which is foundational for both mathematics and ethics. (shrink)

The Rawlsian institutional approach holds that distributive principles apply to socioeconomic institutions rather than transactions within the institutional framework. Critics claim that the approach is baseless. I defend Rawls’s institutionalism by showing that it has a rational basis: Rawls “constructs” a theory of justice from considered judgments, especially ideas found in the political culture and historical conditions of democracy, including the fact of reasonable pluralism, which supports his institutionalism. I use Rawls’s “fact-sensitive constructivism” to interpret his claim that “utilitarianism does (...) not take seriously the distinction between persons.” Rawls’s claim refers to his contrast between impartial spectator reasoning for the classical principle of utility and his original position, which aims to motivate the original position’s use of mutually disinterested parties to an agreement as more accurately reflecting democracy’s fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls then shows that these original position conditions, meant to reflect separate persons in democracy, justify his egalitarian principles over classical utility. I extend his contrast to act-egalitarianism to show that Rawls’s fact-sensitive constructivism supports his institutionalism. I argue that the original position, which reflects separate persons, only justifies the institutional difference principle and that the natural reasoning for act-egalitarianism does not take seriously the separateness of persons. (shrink)

I seek to re-approach the longstanding debate concerning the moral relevance of physical distance by emphasising the important distinction between evaluations of wrongdoing and evaluations of blameworthiness. Drawing in particular on Quality of Will accounts of blameworthiness, I argue that proximity can make an important difference to what qualifies as sufficient moral concern between strangers, and therefore to evaluations of blameworthiness for failures to assist. This implies that even if two individuals (one distant, one proximate) commit an equivalent wrong in (...) ignoring preventable suffering, it can still be the case that the proximate individual is more blameworthy insofar as their disregard expresses a more reprehensible attitude. I argue that emphasising this distinction allows us to make sense of a range of conflicting intuitions with regards to the effects of physical distance on our obligations to assist. (shrink)

In this critical discussion I summarize Sophie-Grace Chappell’s excellent _Epiphanies_. Doing so leads me to ask a question. She is clearly against ‘moral theory’ and puts forward her preferred account of ‘epiphanic reflection’. But does she seek to wholly replace moral theory with epiphanic reflection or is she seeking to achieve a form of accommodation where both are given their due in our everyday moral lives? After voicing this issue I consider what options there might be in order to help (...) us understand the question better and then to answer it. (shrink)

Sophie-Grace Chappell’s recent book Epiphanies is wide-ranging and illuminating, just like its central subject. One basic motif is the ubiquity of value and value expe- rience in the ethical life: we are immersed in a value-laden reality and morality is rooted in this often epiphanic value experience. This results in an emphasis on a broad receptiveness to the surrounding world. One possible pitfall of such an approach could be the reduction of human beings to ethically passive perceivers, waiting for epiphanies (...) to strike them. However, I think such a reading of Epiphanies would be incorrect. Chappell realizes how the ethical life entails more than just passive reception and contemplation; that both the passive and the active parts of the ethical life are important and related. In this article, I aim to avoid the suggested misreading by focussing on one phenomenon that is a good illustration of this interrelation and that is strongly related to epiphanies: creativity. (shrink)

In contemporary metaethics, functionalist theories of moral properties are dominantly naturalistic. This article, however, aims to develop a nonnaturalistic form of moral functionalism. Specifically, I propose a Holistic, Intuitional, and Second-order version of moral functionalism (call it 'HIS Moral Functionalism' for short). The major goal of this article is to show that HIS Moral Functionalism is more plausible than competing functionalist accounts. Moreover, I propose an epistemic formulation of moral naturalism/nonnaturalism, and then argue that HIS Moral Functionalism is a particular (...) brand of moral nonnaturalism. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that specificationism deprives rights of any significant role in practical reasoning before it arrives at a conclusion, while the generalist conception preserves the practical role we intuitively assign to rights in reasoning directed to action. Assuming that a conception of rights faithful to ordinary practical reasoning is preferable, this fact gives a strong reason to prefer generalism over specificationism, although not without qualification. To be satisfactory from the practical standpoint, any account of rights that adopts (...) the generalist view must include second-order principles to orientate agents with regards to addressing rights conflicts. I show that my practical analysis is substantially different from others available in the literature. (shrink)

Recent divine command theorists make a serious and impressive case that a sophisticated divine command theory has significant metaethical advantages and can adequately meet traditional objections, such as the Euthyphro problem. I survey the attempt sympathetically with a view to explaining how the divine command theory can deal with traditional objections while delivering on metaethical desiderata, such as providing an account of ethical objectivity. I argue, however, that to the extent that a divine command theory succeeds, an ideal observer theory (...) can do equally well. Once the divine command theory is rendered immune to Euthyphro-related objections, we will have all the machinery needed to show that an ideal observer theory can provide the same metaethical advantages, without supposing the existence of a divine commander. Other things being equal, ontological simplicity favors the ideal observer theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how realist moral naturalists can provide an intra-theoretic explanation of the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This is a requirement on metaethical theories that has been recently defended by Akhlaghi (2021). After clarifying Akhlaghi’s argument and responding to Evers’s (2021) recent rebuttal, I argue that even under the assumption that moral facts are grounded in an appropriate subset of natural facts (N-facts), there is still a non-zero probability of wholesale moral error. This is demonstrated (...) by considering three types of epistemically possible scenarios: specifically, it could either be that N-facts do not actually exist, or that N-facts exist in a way that entails wholesale moral error, or that N-facts exist in a non-error theoretic way, but their existence is temporally restricted. (shrink)

Whereas Aristotle defended the appropriateness of slavery and Seneca derided only its cruelty, Dio Chrysostom vehemently opposed any argument in favor of keeping slaves. And he did it in the 1st Century CE Greco-Roman world, a society comfortable with slavery. This paper analyzes Dio’s dialogue _The Tenth Discourse: Diogenes or on Servants_ to try to understand how Cynics addressed the wrongs of slavery when so many other philosophers did not. The paper argues that Cynic commitments to self-sufficiency, freedom, and nature (...) helped them to recognize the immorality and injustice of owning slaves. And Dio’s work, which derided injustices that most others defended, shows that philosophers should resist excusing thinkers as mere products of their time, especially canonical figures such as Aristotle and Seneca. Not only were Aristotle and Seneca wrong, but so are contemporary philosophers if they do not hold such historical figures to account by acknowledging and discussing their limitations and faults as thinkers in relation to the historical circumstances they faced. (shrink)

This paper offers a theory of filial piety on which piety is the ethical virtue that responds to the action of person-creating. Piety is the virtue of a creature qua creature. I begin by identifying the action of person-creating as the action of a parent. I then offer some points from the philosophy of action to delineate the action of person-creating. Next, I explain the metaphysical states that this action gives rise to and their value. Parent and child fall in (...) the category of relatives, discussed by Aristotle in his Categories. More specifically, Aristotle says that parent and child are relatives as creator and created. Agreeing with but going beyond Aristotle, I show how parent and child are creator and created as paradigm and image. A pious child is one who images their paradigm well. A child does this by participating in and perfecting the person-creating action of their parent, that is, by being a good person. I argue for the theory’s acceptance on the grounds that it better explains common intuitive judgments about filial piety than do the gratitude theory and the special goods theory (the two most influential and plausible competing theories of filial piety in the philosophical literature). (shrink)