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  1.  18
    Scanlon’s Theories of Blame.Eugene Chislenko - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):371-386.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently offered an influential treatment of blame as a response to the impairment of a relationship. I argue, first, that Scanlon’s remarks about the nature of blame suggest several sharply diverging views, so different that they can reasonably be considered different theories: a judgment-centered theory, on which blame is the reaction the blamer judges appropriate; an appropriateness-centered theory, on which blame is any reaction that is actually appropriate; and a substantive list theory, on which blame is any (...)
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  2.  21
    Moral Blameworthiness, Quality of Will, and Akratic Action.E. J. Coffman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):365-370.
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  3.  12
    The Motivation of the Moral Saint.Christopher G. Framarin - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):387-406.
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  4.  34
    Are Institutions Created by Collective Acceptance?Danny Frederick - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):443-455.
    John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an (...)
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  5.  4
    Are Institutions Created by Collective Acceptance?Danny Frederick - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):443-455.
    John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an (...)
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  6.  12
    Are Institutions Created by Collective Acceptance?Danny Frederick - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):443-455.
    John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an (...)
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  7.  12
    The Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary.Gedalia Haber - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):457-477.
    Is personal moral inconsistency a challenge to overcome or embrace? This paper opts for the latter and argues for the Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary. According to VEC, an individual can balance and realize opposite values or virtues through time virtuously. This paper discusses critically various explanations given for moral inconsistency: Circumstantial Relativism, Moral Opportunism, the Consequentialist Solution, Moral Ambivalence, Kant’s Imperfect Duty and Dancy’s Moral Particularism. The paper argues that VEC fares better in answering the moral challenge of inconsistent (...)
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  8.  45
    Two Arguments for the Badness and Meaninglessness of Life.Iddo Landau - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):429-442.
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  9.  14
    Identity-Directed Norm Transformations and Moral Progress.Paul Morrow - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):493-509.
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  10.  25
    Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364.
    It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...)
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  11.  24
    An Account of Extrinsic Final Value.Levi Tenen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):479-492.
    A number of writers argue that objects can be valuable for their own sakes on account of their extrinsic features. No one has offered an account, though, that shows exactly how or why objects have this sort of value. I seek to provide such an account. I suggest that an object can have final value on account of its relation to someone one loves or admires, where it is one’s warranted love or admiration for the person that renders the related (...)
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  12.  36
    On the Alleged Laziness of Moral Realists.Daniel Weltman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):511-518.
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  13.  18
    Democracy’s Value: A Conceptual Map.Elena Ziliotti - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):407-427.
    The justification of democracy, while widely debated, is hindered by a sub-optimal conceptual framework. For a start, there is confusion about the basic terms in the discussion. Many theorists claim to support either the ‘intrinsic’ or the ‘instrumental’ value of democracy, but it is unclear what this exactly means. Can democracy have other kinds of values? What does it mean to value democracy intrinsically? As a result, at certain points, scholars are talking past one another and their assessments of their (...)
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  14.  34
    Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value.Erik Carlson - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):175-181.
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  15.  9
    Correlativity and the Case Against a Common Presumption About the Structure of Rights.Michael Da Silva - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):289-307.
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  16.  39
    On Moral Objections to Moral Realism.Justin Horn - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):345-354.
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  17.  10
    Sophisticated Alienation.Steven J. Jensen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):309-323.
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  18.  26
    How Deontologists Can Be Moderate.Christa M. Johnson - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):227-243.
    Moderate deontologists hold that while it is wrong to kill an innocent person to save, say, five other individuals, it is indeed morally permissible to kill one if, say, millions of lives are at stake. A basic worry concerning the moderate’s position is whether the view boils down to mere philosophical wishful thinking. In permitting agents to ever kill an innocent, moderates require that agents treat persons as means, in opposition to traditional deontological motivations. Recently Tyler Cook argued that deontologists (...)
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  19. Have Neo-Aristotelians Abandoned Naturalism? On the Distinctively Human Form of Practical Reason.Jessy Jordan - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):183-201.
  20.  5
    Moral Perception Beyond Supervenience: Iris Murdoch’s Radical Perspective.Silvia Panizza - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):273-288.
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  21.  23
    A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):245-255.
    In this paper, we consider Noël Carroll’s Content Theory (CT) (2015) and argue that a key problem with CT is that it can be interpreted in two distinct ways: as a descriptive theory of aesthetic experience and as a normative prescriptive theory. Although CT is presented as a descriptive theory of experience, much of what Carroll says implies that CT can also be understood as a theory about how one ought to look at artworks. We argue that when understood as (...)
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  22.  14
    An Anarchist Interpretation of Marx’s “Ability to Needs” Principle.Jesse Spafford - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):325-343.
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  23.  15
    The Early Confucian Worry About Yuan.Winnie Sung - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):257-271.
    This article focuses on a psychological phenomenon discussed by the early Confucian: yuan 怨, which is often translated as “resentment”, “grievance”, “lament”, or “complaint”. I attempt to use the early Confucian discussions of yuan to shed light on an aspect of human psychology, namely, when one laments about certain conditions that obtain in such a way that she sees as beyond her control and negatively affects her. This is an unusual reactive attitude because one who has yuan takes the “passive (...)
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  24.  11
    Empathy, Power, and Social Difference.Katherine Tullmann - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):203-225.
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  25.  16
    Perfectionism and the Repugnant Conclusion.Simon Beard - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):119-140.
    The Repugnant Conclusion and its paradoxes pose a significant problem for outcome evaluation. Derek Parfit has suggested that we may be able to resolve this problem by accepting a view he calls ‘Perfectionism’, which gives lexically superior value to ‘the best things in life’. In this paper, I explore perfectionism and its potential to solve this problem. I argue that perfectionism provides neither a sufficient means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion nor a full explanation of its repugnance. This is because (...)
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  26.  21
    Embarrassment.Yotam Benziman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):77-89.
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  27.  32
    Alex Rosenberg, How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories: MIT Press, 2018.Michael J. Douma - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):141-144.
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  28.  12
    Toward a Cosmopolitan Ethics of Mobility: The Migrant’s-Eye View of the World, Alex Sager , 103 pp. [REVIEW]Daniel Dzah - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):163-167.
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  29.  70
    A Theory of Just Market Exchange.Ricardo Andrés Guzmán & Michael C. Munger - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):91-118.
    Any plausibly just market exchange must balance two conflicting moral considerations: non-worseness (Wertheimer, 1999) and euvoluntariness (true voluntariness; Munger, 2011). We propose an analytical theory of just market exchange that partly resolves this conflict.
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  30.  39
    Is Animal Suffering Evil? A Thomistic Perspective.B. Kyle Keltz - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):1-19.
    The problem of animal suffering considers whether God would allow millions of years of animal pain, disease, and death. Philosophers who debate this issue often assume that pain and suffering are evils a loving God would not allow without good reason. Moreover, a considerable amount of the debate regarding the problem of animal suffering involves whether animals are capable of experiencing pain and suffering. But this raises the question of whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil. In this essay I (...)
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  31.  10
    David C. Rose, Why Culture Matters Most: Oxford University Press, 2018, 216 pp., £22.99, ISBN: 9780199330720. [REVIEW]Jesper Ahlin Marceta - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):151-153.
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  32.  2
    Christopher Prendergast, Counterfactuals: Paths of the Might Have Been, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. ISBN: 978-1350090088, $88 Hbk. [REVIEW]Jennifer McKitrick - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):155-161.
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  33.  57
    Metaethical Agnosticism: Practical Reasons for Acting When Agnostic About the Existence of Moral Reasons.Joseph Len Miller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):59-75.
    There has been little discussion about how to act when uncertain about the existence of moral reasons in general. In this paper I will argue that despite being uncertain about the existence of moral reasons, someone can still have a practical reason to act in a particular way. This practical reason is morally relevant because it will have an impact on whether we’re making the correct moral decision. This practical reason will result from a principle of decision-making that can be (...)
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  34.  12
    Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood: The Individual or Community?Motsamai Molefe - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):41-57.
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  35.  17
    Iddo Landau: finding meaning in an imperfect world: New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Hardback . € 19.35. 297 + x pp.Xiao Ouyang - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):145-149.
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  36.  16
    Hedonism and the Good Life.Christine Vitrano - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):21-40.
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  37.  3
    The Value of Malevolent Creativity.James S. Pearson - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1 (1):1-18.
    Until recently theorists of creativity have consistently maintained that two necessary conditions must be satisfied in order for us to legitimately ascribe creativity to a given phenomenon: a) that it exhibit novelty, and b) that it possess value. However, researchers investigating malevolent forms of creativity have claimed that the value condition is problematic insofar as we often ascribe creativity to products that are of entirely negative value for us. This has given rise to a number of modified conceptions of the (...)
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  38. Speciesism, Prejudice, and Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Samuel Director - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1:1-20.
    Peter Singer famously argues that speciesism, like racism and sexism, is based on a preju-dice. As Singer argues, since we reject racism and sexism, we must also reject speciesism. Since Singer articulated this line of reasoning, it has become a widespread argument against speciesism. Shelly Kagan has recently critiqued this argument, claiming that one can endorse speciesism with-out doing so on the basis of a prejudice. In this paper, I defend Kagan’s conclusion (that one can endorse speciesism without being prejudiced). (...)
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