Rigidity in the scope of Russell's theory

Noûs 35 (1):1–38 (2001)

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David Sosa
University of Texas at Austin
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00286
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Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference.Robert J. Howell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference.Robert J. Howell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.

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