Millian descriptivism

Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198 (2007)
In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-4544-y
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

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Citations of this work BETA
Arvid Båve (2008). A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.

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