Words and thoughts: subsentences, ellipsis, and the philosophy of language

New York: Published in the United States by Oxford University Press (2006)
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Abstract

It is a near truism of philosophy of language that sentences are prior to words--that they are the only things that fundamentally have meaning. Robert's Stainton's study interrogates this idea, drawing on a wide body of evidence to argue that speakers can and do use mere words, not sentences, to communicate complex thoughts.

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Robert Stainton
Western University

Citations of this work

The Radical Account of Bare Plural Generics.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1303-1331.
Assertion and convention.Mitchell S. Green - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Compositionality.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Experiencing Meanings.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):481-492.

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