Cognition 50:447-68 (1994)
For the last two decades a doctrine called ‘‘eliminative materialism’’ (or sometimes just ‘‘eliminativism’’) has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind. It is easy to understand why eliminativism has attracted so much attention, for it is hard to imagine a more radical and provocative doctrine. What eliminativism claims is that the intentional states and processes that are alluded to in our everyday descriptions and explanations of people’s mental lives and their actions are _myths_. Like the gods that Homer invoked to explain the outcome of battles, or the witches that Inquisitors invoked to explain local catastrophes, they _do not exist_. According to eliminativists, there are no such things as beliefs or desires or hopes or fears or thoughts. These putative states and processes are the badly misguided posits of a seriously mistaken theory, just like phlogiston and caloric fluid and the luminiferous ether.1
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones.James R. O'Shea - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions.Finn Spicer - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):515-529.
Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Benoît Dubreuil - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):483-498.
Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):297-339.
Similar books and articles
Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie.John D. Greenwood - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
Deconstructing the Mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 479-482.
Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.Barbara Hannan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.
Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
The Architectural Nonchalance of Commonsense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.
Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.Adam Arico - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
"Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory.Joel Pust - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads247 ( #14,422 of 2,178,208 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #45,114 of 2,178,208 )
How can I increase my downloads?