Erkenntnis 61 (1):1-16 (2004)

Authors
Mauricio Suárez
Complutense University of Madrid
Abstract
Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifestations are not.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology
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DOI 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037514.89664.ee
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Probability in GRW Theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.
Quantum Propensities.Mauricio Suárez - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):418-438.
GRW as an Ontology of Dispositions.Mauro Dorato & Michael Esfeld - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):41-49.
Bohmian Mechanics Without Wave Function Ontology.Albert Solé - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):365-378.
Quantum Selections, Propensities and the Problem of Measurement.Mauricio Suárez - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):219-255.

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