Time and realism: Metaphysical and antimetaphysical perspectives • by Yuval Dolev

Analysis 69 (2):372-374 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Dolev's ambitious project is to show that the traditional debate in the philosophy of time between the so-called ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theorists is not a sustainable one. The key to the negative portion argument is that both the tensed and tenseless view of time can be understood only from within their respective ontological frameworks. Moreover, that there is only really an appearance of understanding within these frameworks, since neither framework furnishes us with the wherewithal to genuinely understand temporal language. Moving past these frameworks is the goal Dolev sets us. The positive aspect of the text tries to teach us how to transcend this merely ontological dispute and engage in phenomenological considerations of time itself. The conclusion to the positive project is that we cannot postulate an adequate metaphysical system of time, though we can understand what time is if we treat it as the time of our experiences in everyday life .The prospect that we might be able to move past the existing debate into fresh philosophical terrain is exciting. But I am not quite persuaded by the arguments that are intended to motivate the move to pastures new. First, on occasion Dolev seems to slightly …

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-04-11

Downloads
78 (#73,846)

6 months
9 (#1,260,759)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Is ontology the key to understanding tense?Yuval Dolev - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1741-1749.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Tense and reality.Kit Fine - 2005 - In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 261--320.
On presentism and triviality.Thomas M. Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage.Steven F. Savitt - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:153-167.

View all 10 references / Add more references