Abstract

In this paper, I argue that greed is distinguished from self-interest by its irrationality. According to the psychological literature, greed is best understood as a desire for more and more of some resource, coupled with constant dissatisfaction resulting from the feeling of never having enough of that resource. From this, we get greed’s deep irrationality; the greedy person has a desire that can never be satisfied, and in acting greedily they repeatedly set out to do the impossible. On the other hand, we take rationality to be a constitutive part of truly self-interested behavior. Thus, arguments forwarding the idea that “greed is good” either equivocate between greed and self-interest or make untenable claims about greed. So, this paper has two main upshots: we now have a morally-neutral distinction between greed and self-interest, and a reason to reject pro-greed arguments.