Ways of being

In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press (2009)
Authors
Kris McDaniel
Syracuse University
Abstract
There are different ways to be. This paper explicates and defends this controversial thesis. Special attention is given to the meta-ontology of Martin Heidegger.
Keywords meta-ontology  being  existence  Heidegger  ontological pluralism
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Composition as Pattern.Steve Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Are All Primitives Created Equal?James Miller - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):273-292.
A Foundation for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1809–1837.
Ways of Being.Joshua Spencer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):910-918.

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