Ontology

Note: I keep a Stromatolite on my desk, focus on structured emergence in biological systems and wanted to discover its secrets! -/- The Eternal Pulse of Life: Integrating Energy, Metabolism, Information, and Structured Resonance -/- -/- Abstract -/- -/- The origin of life has long been framed as a singular event—a sudden transition from non-life to life. Traditional models attempt to pinpoint this moment through genetic-first (RNA World) or metabolism-first (Prebiotic Chemistry) approaches, but both rely on a stepwise sequence of (...) unlikely breakthroughs. This paper reframes the question entirely: life was never an event, but an inevitable phase transition of structured resonance. -/- -/- Life emerges when energy, matter, and information self-lock into a stable oscillation. It is not a series of lucky chemical reactions but a predictable, self-organizing resonance shift that follows the same principles governing phase transitions in physics. This model integrates: -/- • Nick Lane’s work on bioenergetics and proton motive force, showing that life stabilizes as an energy-driven resonance cycle. -/- • Wave-based resonance dynamics in molecular self-assembly, explaining why biochemistry aligns with structured phase-locking rather than stochastic optimization. -/- • The transition from abiotic autocatalysis to encoded information, demonstrating that molecular replication is a resonance function, not a chance event. -/- • The Great Oxidation Event as a metabolic resonance shift, illustrating that planetary-scale biochemical transitions are structured, not accidental. -/- -/- Life did not “begin.” It emerged as a phase-coherent oscillation between energy gradients, molecular condensation, and self-stabilizing resonance states. This framework unites metabolism, replication, and information processing under a single principle: life is structured resonance. -/- . (shrink)

Cosmovision ni neno ambalo linapaswa kumaanisha seti ya misingi ambayo huibuka uelewa wa kimfumo wa Ulimwengu, sehemu zake kama maisha, ulimwengu tunaoishi, asili, hali ya mwanadamu, na uhusiano wao. Kwa hivyo, ni uwanja wa falsafa ya uchanganuzi inayolishwa na sayansi, ambayo lengo lake ni maarifa haya yaliyojumlishwa na endelevu ya mantiki juu ya kila kitu tulicho nacho na kilichomo, ambacho kinatuzunguka, na kinachohusiana nasi kwa njia yoyote. Ni kitu cha zamani kama mawazo ya mwanadamu, na, pamoja na kutumia vipengele vya (...) kosmolojia ya kisayansi, inajumuisha kila kitu katika falsafa na sayansi ambacho kinarejelea ulimwengu na maisha. Cosmovision si seti ya mawazo, dhahania, na mawazo bali ni mfumo unaozingatia uchunguzi, uchambuzi, ushahidi na maonyesho. Hakuna cosmovision inayonuia kufafanua, kuanzisha, au kupendekeza lakini kuelewa tu, kuchanganua na kufasiri. Kila mmoja wetu hujenga na kusafirisha ulimwengu wake katika maisha yote, bila kuanzisha fomu, kama msingi wa mawazo na tabia zetu. (shrink)

Brentano’s dissertation "Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles" (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle) (1862) is examined in the light of the nineteenth-century debate on the Aristotelian categories. After providing an exposition of the conceptions of the main representatives of this debate, Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Bonitz, this paper assesses Brentano’s point of view on the meaning and origin of the Aristotelian categories. It shows (i) that Brentano assumes non-Aristotelian elements in his reading of the Aristotelian (...) categories, (ii) that this depends on the fact that he shares Bonitz’s thesis, and (iii) that his reading is incomplete in the light of certain Aristotelian statements about non-being. (shrink)

Since the publication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire has been important for disseminating the concept of dialogue in education. Dialogue is often framed as the kind of interaction that educators should enact in their practice, to right historical and socio-political wrongs. With this, speaking and assuming one’s voice has a special place in education, but this paper argues for the significance of listening for any conceptualisation of dialogue. Starting with a description of an event that Freire described as (...) the ‘clearest and most bruising lesson’ of his life as an educator, this paper undertakes a phenomenology of the error leading to his development of dialogue as an educational praxis. From this the paper addresses the question ‘how do we learn when we are wrong?,’ and argues against an exclusively epistemological perspective on dialogue and ‘being wrong’ in favour of an ontological framing of dialogue and ‘being in error’. (shrink)

While the space in which we live operates via a number of physical and mathematical principles, this paper examines a mechanism that lies beyond these principles, called the Principle of Ideas. This mechanism is analyzed here as being the source of universe creation, and which can influence not only human history but also individual lifetimes. Building on work by thinkers such as Nozick, Penrose, and Aristotle, the Principle of Ideas consists of three sub-principles, called the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Universal (...) Principles, which can be pooled to create the concept of maximal existence. In addition to guaranteeing the existence of the universe, maximal existence also influences the form of universe. Using the concept of maximal existence, we can also explain why the physical constant of the universe is precisely adjusted toward the birth of human existence and how the enantiomeric universe as a multiverse can exist. (shrink)

Jacob Roman Parr completes the two-part series Writing while Reading with this second part on the Universal Treatise by Nicholas de Autrecourt but not the second treatise . A potential reader might be interested in reading this book if also interested in temporal modal logic , rigorous phenomenology , things possibly being eternal , somewhat perfect objects , or Writing while Reading : Part 1 , as this part , Part 2 , is also about celestial objects . Writing while (...) Reading : Part 2 : Similar to Part 1 : Jacob Roman Parr reads Exigit ordo by Nicholas de Autrecourt is 31 pages in length with a title page , so 32 pages . (shrink)

[EXTRAIT DU SECOND NUMÉRO DE Mεtascience. TOUS LES ARTICLES ONT ÉTÉ RETIRÉS À L'EXCEPTION DE LA PRÉSENTATION. TOUS LES NUMÉROS SONT DISPONIBLES AUX ÉDITIONS MATÉRIOLOGIQUES]. Ce deuxième numéro de la revue Mεtascience poursuit la caractérisation de cette nouvelle branche du savoir qu’est la métascience. Si elle est nouvelle ce n’est pas en un sens radical puisque Mario Bunge l’a pratiquée de façon exemplaire, puisque les positivistes logiques furent accusés de ne pratiquer qu’une simple métascience, puisque les scientifiques l’ont toujours pratiquée (...) implicitement, et puisque certains philosophes ne pratiquent plus la philosophie mais plutôt la métascience, mais sans la caractériser ou sans la théoriser, c’est-à-dire sans prendre conscience qu’ils ont abandonné un discours général pour un autre. La nouveauté réside donc dans cette prise de conscience qu’un discours général sans la philosophie est possible : un discours général scientifique. Les douze contributions réunies dans ce volume illustrent l’approche métascientifique à la connaissance du monde ainsi qu’à la connaissance de la connaissance du monde, la science. Et comme le projet de Bunge, elles ne s’inscrivent ni dans la mouvance analytique ni dans la mouvance continentale de la philosophie. On lira ici des études sur le système bungéen, des applications de la pensée bungéenne, des contributions métascientifiques, et des réflexions autour de la métascience. Parmi les disciplines métascientifiques, l’ontologie occupe une place de choix dans ce numéro de Mεtascience. La métascience se distingue de la philosophie par son rejet de la distinction philosophique fondamentale entre apparence et réalité. L’ontologie métascientifique ne postule donc l’existence d’aucune réalité métaphysique. Mais l’ontologie métascientifique, pas plus que l’ontologie philosophique, n’est une science factuelle. La première, parce qu’elle étudie des construits scientifiques et non des objets concrets, la seconde, parce qu’elle s’intéresse à des objets transcendants ou métaphysiques. (shrink)

Cet article est une réponse à l’argument de Martin Orensanz selon lequel l’ontologie orientée objet devrait accepter l’existence de la matière en tant qu’objet à la fois sensuel et réel. Que la matière puisse exister en tant qu’objet sensuel, nous l’admettons d’emblée puisque « objet sensuel » est un terme si large que rien ne peut être exclu de cette dénomination. Ce n’est pourtant pas le cas, selon moi, des objets réels, qui doivent exister indépendamment de toute autre entité sus-ceptible (...) de les rencontrer. Cela conduit à un débat sur le caractère transitif de la relation partie à tout, dans lequel Orensanz reprend un argument récent de Daniel Korman, tandis que je défends une position aristotélicienne amendée selon la-quelle seules les parties proximales d’un objet peuvent être considérées comme appartenant à cet objet au sens strict du terme. (shrink)

I have conceptualized a triadic framework, with matter, energy, and life as its components, each defined as a different ontological change. In this talk, I will explore how time might be defined and understood within such a framework.

The concept of human identity has often been framed through economic and materialist paradigms, particularly in Marxist and industrial thought, which have emphasized the proletarian and agricola—the laborer and the productive farmer—as the primary agents of historical development. However, this economic reductionism has marginalized an alternative and equally fundamental mode of existence: the paganus—the rural dweller whose relationship to the world is defined not by labor, but by dwelling, continuity, and embeddedness in place. This paper critically re-examines the paganus as (...) an ontological category distinct from economic determinism, drawing upon phenomenology, ecological philosophy, and political thought to argue for a renewed understanding of human identity beyond its productive function. -/- By engaging with thinkers such as Edward Casey on the topology of place, Martin Heidegger on dwelling, and Henry David Thoreau on experiential solitude in nature, this paper explores the existential depth of inhabiting a place rather than merely exploiting it. The marginalization of the paganus reflects broader cultural and political shifts that have privileged mobility, urbanization, and deterritorialization over rootedness, continuity, and place attachment. This paper contends that the restoration of paganus as a meaningful philosophical category is crucial in addressing contemporary issues such as ecological alienation, the erosion of cultural memory, and the search for belonging in a rapidly urbanizing world. -/- Rather than advocating for a retreat into traditionalism, this study calls for an expansion of human identity beyond economic constraints, reclaiming dwelling as a fundamental human experience. The paganus, far from being an obsolete relic of the past, emerges as a necessary counterpoint to modernity’s abstraction and displacement, offering a vision of human existence that is rooted in place, history, and the enduring rhythms of the natural world. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. There are various grounds for objecting to Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism, but none hold any water. The most common (...) objections are easily dismissed on the basis of the objector’s ignorance that Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism is unique and not subject to the same objections faced by the version of superdeterminism originally put forth by Dr. John Bell. Other objections based on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be dismissed, because Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism disproves the Copenhagen interpretation and there is no direct evidence that the Copenhagen interpretation is true. Finally, a wide range of remaining objections can be dismissed for various specific reasons. (shrink)

Der Band fragt nach geistigen Phänomenen, die von überindividueller Art sind oder sich in Hervorbringungen menschlichen Handelns manifestieren. Auf je verschiedene Weise thematisieren die Autor:innen, wie ein so verstandener objektiver Geist zu denken ist. Im Anschluss an klassische Autoren wie Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Simmel oder Nicolai Hartmann sowie in Bezug auf aktuelle Debatten der "philosophy of mind" und Sozialphilosophie wird erläutert, dass objektiv Geistiges in einem nicht-metaphysischen Sinn verstanden werden kann. In Auseinandersetzung mit Vorstellungen wie "institutional reality" (John (...) Searle) oder "mental commons" (Annette Baier) sollen streng individualistische Konzeptionen des Geistes korrigiert werden. Behandelt werden Fragen zu Hegels Begriff des objektiven Geistes, zur Kulturphilosophie, zur Sozialtheorie, zur analytischen Sozialontologie und zur Philosophie der Kognition. (shrink)

A common distinction in emotion theory is between ‘occurrent emotions’ and ‘dispositional emotions’, ‘emotional episodes’ and ‘emotional states’, ‘emotions’ and ‘sentiments’, or more neutrally between ‘short-term emotions’ and ‘long-term emotions’. While short-term emotions are, or necessarily comprise, experiences, long-term emotions are generally seen as states that can exist without experience. Given the theoretical importance of experience for emotion theorists, long-term emotions are often cast aside as of secondary importance, or at any rate as in need of separate treatment. In this (...) paper, I cast doubt on the distinction. I argue that the considerations that support a view of long-term emotions as non-experiential states equally support a view of short-term emotions as non-experiential states, and so long-term and short-term emotions are ultimately the same sort of thing. If I am right, the dominant experience-centered accounts of emotions are at best accounts, not of emotions per se, but of some closely related phenomenon. (shrink)

We argue that four-dimensionalists should adopt a contextualist semantics, according to which ordinary speakers’ judgments may concern person-stages, person-segments or person-worms, depending on the context. We explain how context helps select the boundaries of the temporal parts we refer to or quantify over and show that contextualism offers the best treatment of ordinary predications and ordinary counting judgments. Contextualism implies an error theory; however, we explain why this error theory is less problematic than those entailed by the worm and stage (...) theories. (shrink)

Сборникът съдържа статии и студии във връзка със семинара „Хаос и безредие (философия, литература, наука)" в Софийския университет „Св. Климент Охридски“ през академичната 2014-15 г. Темите, на които са посветени отделните разработки, са: случайността; материалността на художествената творба; техниката в езика и философията; отношението между контекст и дистекст; миметичността и саморефлексията в литературата; философското осмисляне на дистанцията и нейната промяна (близост и далечина); както и двойничеството, изродното (das Unheimliche) и технологичното като фигури на нечовешкото. Повечето понятия, които се свързаха в (...) обсъжданията и дискусиите ни, са функционирали всъщност като аномалии - така се отварят общи полета на несъгласия, които разширяват сетивността или теоретическата чувствителност. (shrink)

The existence of God is a controversial topic. Believers in God often claim there is evidence supporting God's existence and defend these arguments. Those who argue against the existence of God provide reasons and evidence for why God's nonexistence should be accepted. However, neither side has been able to convince the other. In this article, definitive proofs of God's nonexistence and the true nature of reality will be presented. When it comes to definitive proofs, examples can often be drawn from (...) mathematics. For instance, we can definitively prove that two plus two equals four. Similarly, this article will explain why God is a contradictory being and employ methods as rigorous as those used in mathematical proofs. Using the principles of logic, we will attempt to explain the nature of reality step by step. Undoubtedly, there are many valuable ideas proposed throughout the history of philosophy, and this article will aim to provide a general proof for these concepts as well. (shrink)

A experiência da transcendência remonta ao começo da filosofia. Em sua busca por fixar a ideia do bem como o aprendizado mais sublime a que se devia almejar, para quem se pusesse no caminho da filosofia, Platão evoca a transcendência, quando indica que aquela ideia fundamental, como fonte originante do ser e da essência, sem que ela mesma seja essência, repousa e exerce seu domínio para além da essência (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). É por isso que, como disse Hans-Georg Gadamer certa (...) vez, "a ideia do bem é o ponto mais alto no pensamento platônico" ainda que "não seja apreensível como os outros objetos do ensino", pois "ela é ideia; ela é a perspectiva em tudo". Nos Problemas Fundamentais da Fenomenologia, Heidegger diz que "o que buscamos é a ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας", ciente, contudo, de que "em sua unidade ekstático-horizontal, a temporalidade é a condição fundamental da possibilidade do ἐπέκεινα, isto é, da transcendência que constitui o próprio ser-aí". Neste belo trabalho de Bruno Lemos Hinrichsen, o leitor encontrará o esclarecimento suficiente dessa surpreendente e enigmática experiência da transcendência, que alimenta as raízes do ato de filosofar e da filosofia. Gilfranco Lucena dos Santos Universidade Federal da Paraíba. (shrink)

The philosophical tradition says that Immanuel Kant’s critique of the theoretical reason is an attempt to epistemological foundation. The model is based on the relationship between subject and object and aims to determine the limits of the possibility of knowledge. This would follow from the Kantian denial to the pure metaphysical intelligibility. Such ontology, however, would not focus on the naming of pure objects or pure intelligibility. It is then intended to debate the possibility of a transcendental ontology that is (...) based on the objectuality of empirical objects, which points to the Heideggerian interpretation of Kantian thought. Thus, this paper hopes to contribute to the theme of the possibility of a Kantian ontology with view to the objectuality of the objects. (shrink)

In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger develops an account of non-being according to which it is understood as a part of Different. Yet the precise language he uses to characterize the form Non-Being and other negative forms has two variations. In the first, a negative form is characterized as a part of the nature of Different contraposed to the nature of the form negated. Thus, Non-Beautiful is described as ‘something different among beings that is marked-off from some one kind and (...) in turn contraposed with something among beings’ (257e2-4), and Non-Being is identified as ‘the part of the nature of Different contraposed with the being of each thing’ (258e2). In the second variation, however, a negative form is characterized as the contraposing (antithesis) of the nature of a part of Different relative to the nature of the form negated. Hence, Non-Beautiful ‘turns out to be a contraposing of being in relation to being’ (257e6-7) and Non-Being is ‘the contraposing of the nature of a part of Different and of the nature of Being’ (258a11-b1). In this essay, I develop an account of the parts of Different that explains the two variants in the Stranger’s characterization of negative forms, focusing on the Stranger’s description of the Non-Beautiful as a part of Different. Since the Stranger’s account of the parts of Different is based on an analogy with parts of knowledge, I begin by examining what it means to be a part of knowledge, drawing on Socrates’ account of knowledge in Republic V. (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda la recepción de los 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' (1844) de K. Marx en la obra de H. Marcuse. En sus ensayos «Nuevas fuentes para la fundamentación del materialismo histórico» (1932) y «Sobre los fundamentos filosóficos del concepto científico-económico de trabajo» (1933), Marcuse empieza a tomar distancia respecto de su anterior pretensión de hallar un soporte ontológico para el materialismo histórico recurriendo exclusivamente a la fenomenología existencial de Heidegger. A partir de la primera publicación de los (...) 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' en 1932, el autor berlinés buscará fundamentar ontológicamente el materialismo histórico con el recurso a la obra juvenil de Marx. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer—despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of substantial form. This (...) examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of information beyond its common role as descriptive data. It suggests that information operates as an intrinsic structure, influencing and defining systems across different dimensions and contexts, much like a universal “instruction set.” From societal bonds to natural phenomena, information is not passive but dynamic and often self-propagating, like a force. This document examines the function, autonomy, and density of information, considering it as fundamental to existence itself.

The quantum measurement problem is one of the most profound challenges in modern physics, questioning how and why the wavefunction collapses during measurement to produce a single observable outcome. In this paper, we propose a novel solution through a logical framework called Aethic reasoning, which reinterprets the ontology of time and information in quantum mechanics. Central to this approach is the Aethic principle of extrusion, which models wavefunction collapse as progression along a Markov chain of block universes, effectively decoupling the (...) Einsteinian flow of time from quantum collapse events. This principle introduces an additional degree of freedom to time, enabling the first Aethic postulate: that informational reality is reference-dependent, akin to the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity. This reference point, or Aethus, is rigorously defined within a mathematical structure. Building on this foundation, the second postulate resolves the distinction between quantum superpositions and logical contradictions by encoding superpositions in a “backend” Aethic framework before rendering observable states. The third postulate further distinguishes quantum coherence from decoherence using a two-generational model of state inheritance, potentially advancing beyond simpler interpretations of information leakage. Together, these postulates yield a direct theoretical derivation of the collapse postulate, fully consistent with empirical results such as the outcome of the double-slit experiment. By addressing foundational aspects of quantum mechanics through a logically robust and philosophically grounded lens, this framework sheds new light on the measurement problem and offers a solid foundation for future exploration. (shrink)

The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences, has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to its subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological (...) view’, according to which the subject, in being pre-reflectively self-conscious, is just aware of their own occurrent mental state. In this paper, I argue in favour of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured ‘fact-like’ entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one’s own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. (shrink)

During the 1950s XIONG Shili’s 熊十力(1885–1968) ti-yong metaphysics underwent some profound changes. Focussing on his 1958 publication, Tiyong lun 體用論 (Treatise on reality and function), this paper seeks to explain the role that the concept of change played in the articulation of his core metaphysical tenet, “the non-duality of ti and yong” (體用不二). It will further propose that this understanding of the role of change also served as his mature solution to the Buddhist problematic of avoiding the two extremes v(二見、二邊) (...) of reification and nihilism, which XIONG characterizes in terms of believing either that things endure over time (continua) or that things cease to exist. -/- . (shrink)

Some philosophical pluralists argue that both a top-down and a bottom-up approach serve as equally justified methods for engaging in ontological inquiry. In the top-down approach, we start with an analysis of theory and extrapolate from there to the world. In the bottom-up approach, we begin with an empirical investigation of the world and let our theory respond accordingly. The idea is that ontological conclusions arrived at via these two equally justified methods are then also equally justified. In this paper, (...) I argue that top-down/bottom-up methodological pluralism inadvertently grants primacy to the top-down approach. I go on to suggest that this is, in fact, unavoidable because it applies to ontological inquiry in general. Ontological inquiry invariably adopts the top-down approach because (a) ontological conclusions are not revealed during empirical investigations; instead, they are conceptual (i.e. theoretical) posits asserted top-down and (b) even if we consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches during ontological inquiry, such a consideration itself occurs from within theory (i.e. top-down). (shrink)

The debate on the nature of the artefacts is very important for contemporary metaphysicians. In this paper we will discuss the standard position in the debate, what we will call it Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism – such as Baker, Evnine or Thomasson –, that considers the essence of artifacts in terms of intentions of the makers. The aim will be to introduce a new criticism to this proposal based on the undesirable metaphysical and moral consequences that this proposal involve. To do this, (...) in the first section an important notion into the feminist metaphysics, and we will be inspired into this in order to introduce a new important notion for our debate: the artifactification. Nextly, we will explain the debate on the nature of artifacts and the Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism. Consequently, we will introduce two different scenarios based on the artifactification’s notion that it will show problems for Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism because they show how easily would be produce artifacts using persons as their matter, that involve undesirable consequences. (shrink)

Both relativistic mechanics and Newtonian mechanics are based on principles that have ontological implications. We propose a series of formalisms that rigorously define the ontology underlying mechanical theories, in order to clarify and formally establish the ontology of the physics of motion. Special attention has been paid to relativistic theories. Through the proposed methodology, the concept of ontological consistency is developed and the conditions required for such consistency to be satisfied in any theory are established. In particular, the consistency test (...) is performed for Newtonian mechanics, special relativity theory, and general relativity theory. (shrink)

Translation of the book "Metaphysik: Eine Einführung" by Christof Rapp published in C.H. Beck Verlag.

The paper seeks to delve into the complex philosophical landscape of Deleuze and Guattari’s “A thousand plateaus” and to propose a comparation between their concept of “War Machine” and that of “Artistic Alienation” from Herbert Marcuse’s mature work. The analysis will be conducted through an initial yet obliged brief deconstruction of Deleuze and Guattari’s relational ontology, with a particular focus on the concepts of Ritornello and Territory. Ultimately, the insights gained from the combination of Marcuse’s philosophy of art and Deleuze (...) and Guattari’s ontology will be used to interpret the function of education in contemporary society. Specifically, I propose to promote artistic alienation to encourage imagination and creativity in learning. Furthermore, I argue that education should function as a "war machine," challenging traditional teaching paradigms and enabling students to explore nowadays' critical issues. (shrink)

Intuition and Knowledge in Nicolai Hartmann (1911-1926). On the Premises of Critical Ontology. The author considers Nicolai Hartmann’s main points on the relationship between intuition and knowledge in his early and middle works (1911-1926). The author first shows how Hartmann’s critical ontology emerged as a reaction to the approach of the logical idealism of the Marburg School, against which Hartmann defends the existence of an irrational dimension of knowledge that legitimizes a minimum of metaphysics even in the gnoseological sphere. The (...) author then focuses on the way in which Hartmann interprets the relationship between intuition and givenness, apriority, status of a priori principles, and understanding. Hartmann argues that intuition is not exclusively the same as empirical intuition, and that the problem of knowledge should no longer be considered in terms of the distinction between sensibility and understanding, but through the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. (shrink)

Il presente lavoro di ricerca apre il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura della vita e della salute all’analitica della relazione fondamentale tra essere e speranza nella dimensione della cura. Attraverso l’analisi del rapporto tra “cura”, “limite” e “speranza” nel tempo della tecnica, si sono ricercate le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dal confronto con la concettualizzazione heideggeriana dell’ “aver cura”, dalla ricomprensione della nozione jaspersiana di “situazione limite” e (...) dalla possibilità dell’ “apertura” marceliana alla speranza nelle pratiche concrete della cura, la ricerca si è indirizzata verso la valutazione di un’analitica della cura alla luce della speranza e l’indicazione della trascendenza valoriale della cura. La speranza emerge infatti quale «fondamento originario e originante della cura», radice di un con-essere curante comunionale proteso «tra situazionalità limite dell’esistenza e apertura trascendente della speranza». In tale orizzonte si sono scorti gli apporti alla filosofia ed etica della cura, alla luce della speranza di bene che apre e illumina «la dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura». (shrink)

Modal phenomena in general, and modal claims in particular, present a problem for contemporary philosophers. The truth conditions of modal claims differ from those of nonemodal claims. I discuss a widely accepted strategy that posits possible and impossible worlds in order to analyze modal claims and thus systematize our intuitions about modal reality.

These comments were presented as part of an exchange with Peter van Inwagen in January of 2014 during the California Metaphysics Conference at the University of Southern California. They have not been updated or changed since their presentation. (I refer to van Inwagen as ‘Peter’, which I would not do in a published paper. I make some jokey remarks that might have been sort of alright if you heard them only once spoken aloud, but as I read them now make (...) me cringe a bit. And so on.) These comments were never published. (shrink)

This title from the De Gruyter Book Archive has been digitized in order to make it available for academic research. It was originally published under National Socialism and has to be viewed in this historical context. Learn more. >.

An attempt to vindicate naive set theory by postulating a universal set V which is describable in two distinct description languages: predicative and extensional. The extensional description of a set consists of describing all its elements whereas its predicative description consists of describing what sets it is an element of. -/- Extensionally described V has an uncapturable description length, akin to its cardinality. But predicatively described, in virtue of being the set that is not contained in any set whatsoever, V (...) has a minimal description length, a counterbalance to its cardinality. -/- Descriptive efficiency can genuinely be attributed to V (achieved in a third description language) only if it contains predicatively indiscernible but extensionally discernible sets. (shrink)

The book results from several years of work on the problems of consciousness and the self as they are currently posed in the Philosophy of mind and Philosophy of psychiatry. I debate various theories of the self, including those found in contemporary versions of dualism, panpsychism, structuralism, enactivism, and predictive processing, while working towards naturalising the phenomenology of subjectivity.

Frontmatter -- Einleitung -- Erster Teil: Allgemeiner Begriff der Kategorien -- I. Abschnitt. Die Kategorien and das ideale Sein -- 1. Kapitel. Gleichsetzung von Prinzipien und Wesenheiten -- 2. Kapitel. Aufhebung der Gleichsetzung. Die Abgrenzung -- 3. Kapitel. Die Kategorien des idealen Seins -- 4. Kapitel. Inhaltlicher Überschuß der Realkategorien -- II. Abschnitt. Ontologische Fassungen und Fehlerquellen -- 5. Kapitel. Didaktischer Wert der Vorurteile -- 6. Kapitel. Der kategoriale Chorismos und die Homonymie -- 7. Kapitel. Kategoriale Grenzüberschreitung und Heterogeneität -- (...) 8. Kapitel. Kategorialer Teleologismus und Normativismus -- 9. Kapitel. Kategorialer Formalismus -- III. Abschnitt. Erkenntnistheoretische Fassungen und Fehlerquellen -- 10. Kapitel. Neue Aufgaben der Vernunftkritik -- 11. Kapitel. Kategorialer Apriorismus und Rationalismus -- 12. Kapitel. Vorurteile in den Identitätsthesen -- 13. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil der logisch-ontologischen Identität -- 14. Kapitel. Konsequenzen aus der Kritik der Identitätsthesen -- IV. Abschnitt. Fehlerquellen der philosophischen Systematik -- 15. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des Einheitspostulats -- 16. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des kategorialen Dualismus -- 17. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des Harmoniepostulats -- Zweiter Teil: Die Lehre von den Fundamentalkategorien -- I. Abschnitt. Die Schichten des Realen und die Sphären -- 18. Kapitel. Die Erkenntnissphäre und ihre Stufen -- 19. Kapitel. Das Hineinspielen der idealen und logischen Sphäre -- 20. Kapitel. Die Lehre von den Schichten des Realen -- 21. Kapitel. Schichten des Realen und Schichten der Kategorien -- 22. Kapitel. Einordnung der sekundären Sphären in die Schichten des Realen -- II. Abschnitt. Die elementaren Gegensatzkategorien -- 23. Kapitel. Die Stellung der Seinsgegensätze. Geschichtliches -- 24. Kapitel. Die Tafel der Seinsgegensätze -- 25. Kapitel. Die innere Bezogenheit in der Gegensätzlichkeit -- 26. Kapitel. Gegenseitige Überordnung und Implikation der Gegensätze -- III. Abschnitt. Die Abwandlung der Seinsgegensätze in den Schichten -- 27. Kapitel. Kategorien minimaler Abwandlung -- 28. Kapitel. Relation und Substrat, Form und Materie -- 29. Kapitel. Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit -- 30. Kapitel. Gegensatz und Dimension, Diskretion und Kontinuität -- 31. Kapitel. Determination und Dependenz -- 32. Kapitel. Einstimmigkeit und Widerstreit -- 33. Kapitel. Element und Gefüge -- 34. Kapitel. Inneres und Äußeres -- IV. Abschnitt. Die Kategorien der Qualität -- 35. Kapitel. Das Positive und das Negative -- 36. Kapitel. Identität und Verschiedenheit -- 37. Kapitel. Allgemeinheit und Individualität -- 38. Kapitel. Die qualitative Mannigfaltigkeit -- V. Abschnitt. Kategorien der Quantität -- 39. Kapitel. Eines und Vieles -- 40. Kapitel. Das Unendliche und das Continuum der reellen Zahlen -- 41. Kapitel. Die Rechnung und das Berechenbare -- Dritter Teil: Die kategorialen Gesetze -- I. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Geltung -- 42. Kapitel. Das Problem der kategorialen Gesetzlichkeit -- 43. Kapitel. Das Geltungsgesetz des "Prinzips" -- 44. Kapitel. Die drei übrigen Geltungssätze -- II. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Kohärenz -- 45. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Verbundenheit -- 46. Kapitel. Die Gesetzlichkeit der interkategorialen Relation -- 47. Kapitel. Das Wesen der kategorialen Implikation -- 48. Kapitel. Zur Geschichte und Metaphysik der kategorialen Kohärenz -- 49. Kapitel. Hegels Idee der Dialektik -- ¿II. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Schichtung -- 50. Kapitel. Das Höhenverhältnis der Kategorien -- 51. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Wiederkehr -- 52. Kapitel. Zur Metaphysik der kategorialen Wiederkehr -- 53. Kapitel. Gesetz der Abwandlung und Gesetz des Novums -- 54. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Schichtendistanz -- IV. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Dependenz -- 55. Kapitel. Schichtung und Abhängigkeit -- 56. Kapitel. Das kategoriale Grundgesetz -- 57. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Indifferenz und die lnversionstheorien -- 58. K. (shrink)

A speculative exploration of the distinction between a relational formal ontology and a classical formal ontology for modelling phenomena in nature that exhibit relationally-mediated wholism, such as phenomena from quantum physics and biosemiotics. Whereas a classical formal ontology is based on mathematical objects and classes, a relational formal ontology is based on mathematical signs and categories. A relational formal ontology involves nodal networks (systems of constrained iterative processes) that are dynamically sustained through signalling. The nodal networks are hierarchically ordered and (...) exhibit characteristics of deep learning. Clarifying the distinction between classical and relational formal ontologies may help to clarify the role of interpretative context in physics (eg. the role of the observer in quantum theory) and the role of hierarchical nodal networks in computational simulations of learning in artificial intelligence. (shrink)