Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality
Abstract
Under review at Philosophical Psychology. E-mail for draft
A recent trend in philosophical psychology is to construct environmentalist explanations for seemingly non-normative epistemological observations. On such accounts, these outcomes arise not because of – and so are not evidence for – motivated irrationality (as vice epistemology claims). In this paper, I offer a systematic analysis of the explanatory merits of environmentalist accounts and contrast them with explanations offered by vice epistemology. I show how this allows us to make progress in the rationality debate, which recently has been diagnosed to be stuck because of the observational equivalence problem of motivated reasoning. Specifically, the proposed framework reveals that environmentalism threatens to obscure the normative target of the rationality debate and needs a more substantive conception of epistemic rationality to be a genuine alternative. I suggest that the a closer engagement with questions of cognitive agency – how rational creatures can ‘make up’ their minds about what to believe – can provide a pathway for environmentalism to carve out a comprehensive theory of rationality and bring the rationality debate forward.