A critique of ontological pluralism

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia (31):7-31 (2015)
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Abstract

Scientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an “ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I suggest that positions known as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories.

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Juan Vila
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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References found in this work

On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
On what there is.W. V. Quine - 1953 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-19.
1953 and all that. A tale of two sciences.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):335-373.
Causality and complementarity.Niels Bohr - 1937 - Philosophy of Science 4 (3):289-298.

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