Abstract

This dissertation is concerned with philosophy, economics and language. In philosophy, we are concerned with the philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn. We depart from traditional views of Kuhn in order to examine the use of the Kuhnian model outside of its intended sphere of the physical sciences. Our interest in economics is to see how the Kuhnian model can be used in that discipline. We argue that Kuhn's model is of great value in economics. However we depart from traditional philosophical discussions of economics in that we do not address the question as to whether or not economics should be considered a science. Our interest in language derives from the specific interpretation of Kuhn that we present. ;The interpretation of Kuhn has several components. Kuhn argues that in the history of science there are periods of conceptual discontinuity called revolutions. During a revolution a scientific paradigm is replaced by another, incompatable paradigm. Our interpretation of this view is that the cataclysmic nature of a paradigm change must be seen philosophically as a change in metaphysical views. Our second major interpretation of Kuhn leads directly to the discussion of language. If our first interpretation is correct, that major revolutions in science involve changes in particular metaphysical views, then we may ask how such changes are possible. One learns a discipline by learning the language of that discipline. One learns a science by, among other things, working problems. The way in which one learns to solve problems is by ostension. Learning by ostension is what ties together language, philosophy and science. The process of learning science, Kuhn argues, occurs ostensively by solving problems. Learning the science is to acquire the language of the science. However the process of acquiring the language involves the acquisition of a particular metaphysical view. ;The third interpretation of Kuhn that we offer is that his work presents challenge to the traditional Cartesian foundation of science. The upshot of his work is that that basis is no longer valuable. Kuhn's point is historical in that it is based upon his review of the literature surrounding major scientific discoveries. He concludes that the development-by-accumulation model has no historical basis. Our point is philosophical. We claim that the philosophic basis of the development by accumulation model is Cartesian and as the model is discarded so must the underlying metaphysics. The adoption of a Kuhnian model in economics requires that remedial metaphysical work be done. That work we term the philosophy of economics. We close with a brief discussion of the topics with which that philosophy would deal