Conceptual role semantics for moral terms

Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30 (2001)
This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding this "conceptual role semantics" approach as preferable to noncognitivism, the causal theory of reference, and noncircular conceptual analysis.
Keywords conceptual role semantics   metaethics
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-110-1-1
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Matthew S. Bedke (2012). Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2004). The Return of Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.
Ralph Wedgwood (2009). The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):499-519..

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