Abstract
The author evaluates susan haack's criticisms of michael dummett's logical intuitionism and concludes that haack fails to discredit dummett's position. Haack argues that dummett's version fails since (1) he rejects inductive evidence; (2) cannot distinguish ultimately between truth- and assertibility-Conditions; and (3) recognizes that his arguments, Regrettably, Establish antirealism (i.E., Subjective idealism) for all areas. The author shows that dummett accepts inductive evidence for the set of decidable cases, Distinguishes between truth- and assertibility-Conditions by accepting that a sentence may be assertible but not true, And that haack's conclusion regarding (3) rests on her misreading. ((please note that an important quote was omitted on p. 338 and the errata appears in a later issue of "philosophical studies".()