Abstract

Michael Dummett argues for an epistemically constrained theory of meaning cashed out as the demand for warranted assertibility. Since such a meaning theory precludes the possibility of meaning understood in virtue of evidence-independent truth, this is an antirealist theory of meaning. ;I argue that, while Dummett's general antirealist strategy is sound, there is a problem when he applies it to the concept of time. For when we apply Dummett's warranted assertibility demand to sentences about time, we seem to be forced into a vicious regress of synonymy or a realist interpretation of time. Furthermore, his application leads to such claims as 'backward causation' and self-refutation of McTaggart's antirealist arguments about time. Such problems are the result of Dummett's empirical assumption that time is a physical existence given to us in experience. However, Dummett never gives any argument for EA, and such arguments by other philosophers, including those based on contemporary physics, are found to be unconvincing. ;I further argue that a conception of time as a condition of assertibility is a viable solution to the problem of our understanding of time. That is, I suggest that time is a necessary feature of the noetic structure of language that permits the possibility of assertion. For time does seem a necessary feature of all assertions since there are no 'tenseless' assertions. Furthermore, it is only by understanding time as part of the noetic structure that its unique relations can be accounted for. Most importantly, such an understanding of time seems not only consistent with but actually favored by Dummett's theory of meaning when divested of its EA tendencies. Finally, time as a condition of assertibility is consistent with current physical theory