On the Appearance and Reality of Mind

Journal of Mind and Behavior 37 (1):47-70 (2016)
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Abstract

According to what I will call the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind,” conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I also defend the doctrine from some objections. Finally, I spell out the important metaphysical and epistemological implications of the appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind.

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Demian Whiting
University of Hull

Citations of this work

Consciousness and Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge.
The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds.Giovanni Merlo - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):633-664.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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