Are species sets?

Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):413-431 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I construe the question Are species sets? as a question about whether species can be conceived of as sets, as the term set is understood by contemporary logicians. The question is distinct from the question Are species classes?: The conception of classes invoked by Hull and others differs from the logician's conception of a set. I argue that species can be conceived of as sets, insofar as one could identify a set with any given species and that identification would satisfy three desiderata: the set would be a set of organisms, the identification would be apposite, and the identification would permit the formulation of statements about species in set-theoretic terms. One cannot, however, identify a species with any given set. Understanding the claim that species are sets in this way enables one to understand better the dispute between some who accept the claim (e.g., Kitcher 1984, 1987) and some who apparently reject it (e.g., Mayr 1987).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,419

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A (not-so-radical) solution to the species problem.Bradley E. Wilson - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):339-356.
Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species.Rick O’Neil - 1997 - Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
The cladistic solution to the species problem.Mark Ridley - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism.Ingo Brigandt - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
45 (#262,150)

6 months
2 (#300,644)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

A (not-so-radical) solution to the species problem.Bradley E. Wilson - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):339-356.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Methods of Logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1950 - Harvard University Press.
A matter of individuality.David L. Hull - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):335-360.
Species.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.

View all 22 references / Add more references