Foundational assumption reasonable but uncertain

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e137 (2021)
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Abstract

We offer thoughts on Shadmehr and Ahmed's foundational assumption that behavioral intensity (vigor) is proportional to the perceived value of outcomes driving behavior (incentives). The assumption is reasonable considering classical motivational thought and scholarship in related literatures but called into question by an influential contemporary theory of motivation by Brehm. Brehm's theory suggests that the assumption is warranted in some, but not all, performance circumstances. Furthermore, proportionality between vigor and value might be generated through a deliberative goal-setting process rather than through intrinsic neural linkages.

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