Obligation, Responsibility and Alternate Possibilities

Analysis 53 (1):51 - 53 (1993)
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Abstract

It has recently been argued that the principle that "ought" implies "can" entails the principle that moral responsibility requires alternate possibilities, and hence that the acceptance of the former principle requires acceptance of the latter. This paper disputes the alleged entailment and gives reasons for accepting the former principle while rejecting the latter

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Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

Citations of this work

I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.

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