Abstract

Disagreements about matters of personal taste are a rather resilient kind of phenomenon that calls for an unorthodox solution. Hybrid taste-expressivism seems to provide such a solution because it explains taste disagreements in non-doxastic terms. According to it, utterances of taste sentences play a dual role—on the one hand, they are used to express propositions in which objects are ascribed taste properties and, on the other hand, they are used to manifest evaluations of the objects contained in the propositions. The non-doxastic nature of taste disagreements is derived from the latter. My aim is to cast some doubt on the prospects of the hybrid taste-expressivist account. Although I admit that this explanation is on the right track in treating taste disagreements as non-doxastic, hybrid taste expressivism does not seem to be general enough. There are some instances of taste disagreement that are not amenable to this kind of explanation. I provide an alternative explanation that retains the non-doxastic nature of taste disagreements, but does not suffer from its limited explanatory power.