Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794 (2016)
AbstractIt has recently become popular to apply expressivism outside the moral domain, e.g., to truth and epistemic justification. This paper examines the prospects of generalizing expressivism to taste. This application has much initial plausibility. Many of the standard arguments used in favor of moral expressivism seem to apply to taste. For example, it seems conceivable that you and I disagree about whether chocolate is delicious although we don’t disagree about the facts, which suggests that taste judgments are noncognitive attitudes rather than beliefs. However, there is also a striking difference between moral disagreements and disagreements about taste. Faced with a moral disagreement, we intuit that either party is at fault. Disagreements about taste, by contrast, are occurrences where neither party intuitively is at fault. This leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, if a disagreement in attitude is not intuited as faultless, then it seems implausible if applied to taste. If, on the other hand, a disagreement in attitude is a disagreement that we intuit as faultless, then it seems implausible if applied to the moral domain. The aim of this paper is to examine how an expressivist can avoid this dilemma.
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References found in this work
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work
Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and Faultless Disagreement.Crispin Wright - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):432-448.
Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):252-280.
The Nature of Disagreement: Matters of Taste and Environs.Jeremy Wyatt - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10739-10767.
Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.
Conversations About Taste, Contextualism, and Non-Doxastic Attitudes.Marián Zouhar - 2018 - Tandf: Philosophical Papers 47 (3):429-460.
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