Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Inductive influence.Jon Williamson - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689 - 708.
    Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief ½ to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Why Probability isn’t Magic.Fabio Rigat - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (3):977-985.
    “What data will show the truth?” is a fundamental question emerging early in any empirical investigation. From a statistical perspective, experimental design is the appropriate tool to address this question by ensuring control of the error rates of planned data analyses and of the ensuing decisions. From an epistemological standpoint, planned data analyses describe in mathematical and algorithmic terms a pre-specified mapping of observations into decisions. The value of exploratory data analyses is often less clear, resulting in confusion about what (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making sense of method: Comments on Richard Jeffrey.David Miller - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):139 - 147.
  • The plain man's guide to probability. [REVIEW]Colin Howson - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):157-170.
  • Falsification of Propensity Models by Statistical Tests and the Goodness-of-Fit Paradox.Christian Hennig - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):166-192.
    Gillies introduced a propensity interpretation of probability which is linked to experience by a falsifying rule for probability statements. The present paper argues that general statistical tests should qualify as falsification rules. The ‘goodness-of-fit paradox’ is introduced: the confirmation of a probability model by a test refutes the model's validity. An example is given in which an independence test introduces dependence. Several possibilities to interpret the paradox and to deal with it are discussed. It is concluded that the propensity interpretation (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explicativity, corroboration, and the relative odds of hypotheses.Irving John Good - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):39 - 73.
  • The subjective theory of probability. [REVIEW]D. A. Gillies - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):138-157.