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Philosophy and artificial intelligence

In Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence. Humanities Press (1979)

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  1. Philosophic sur ordinateur ou intelligence artificielle.Gilbert Boss & Maryvonne Longeart - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (2):271-.
    L'informatique se définissant comme le traitement rationnel de l'information par machine automatique et l'intelligence se caractérisant par une même capacité de traitement rationnel, il était inévitable que l'on songe à associer l'intelligence au traitement automatique de l'information. C'est ce qu'a fait John McCarthy en forgeant le terme d'intelligence artificielle. Par «intelligence artificielle» on peut vouloir exprimer l'ambition de1. Recréer, transformer ou développer l'intelligence artificiellement2. Simuler l'intelligence en la reconstituant dans des modéles imitant certains aspects de notre intelligence dite naturelle.
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  • Exploring Minds: Modes of Modeling and Simulation in Artificial Intelligence.Hajo Greif - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (4):409-435.
    The aim of this paper is to grasp the relevant distinctions between various ways in which models and simulations in Artificial Intelligence (AI) relate to cognitive phenomena. In order to get a systematic picture, a taxonomy is developed that is based on the coordinates of formal versus material analogies and theory-guided versus pre-theoretic models in science. These distinctions have parallels in the computational versus mimetic aspects and in analytic versus exploratory types of computer simulation. The proposed taxonomy cuts across the (...)
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  • Reduction and levels of explanation in connectionism.John Sutton - 1995 - In P. Slezak, T. Caelli & R. Clark (eds.), Perspectives on cognitive science: theories, experiments, and foundations. Ablex. pp. 347-368.
    Recent work in the methodology of connectionist explanation has I'ocrrsccl on the notion of levels of explanation. Specific issucs in conncctionisrn hcrc intersect with rvider areas of debate in the philosophy of psychology and thc philosophy of science generally. The issues I raise in this chapter, then, are not unique to cognitive science; but they arise in new and important contexts when connectionism is taken seriously as a model of cognition. The general questions are the relation between levels and the (...)
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