This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
91 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Adele A. Abrahamsen (1993). Cognizers' Innards and Connectionist Nets: A Holy Alliance? Mind and Language 8 (4):520-530.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jarmo J. Ahonen (1994). On Qualitative Modelling. AI and Society 8 (1):17-28.
    Fundamental assumptions behind qualitative modelling are critically considered and some inherent problems in that modelling approach are outlined. The problems outlined are due to the assumption that a sufficient set of symbols representing the fundamental features of the physical world exists. That assumption causes serious problems when modelling continuous systems. An alternative for intelligent system building for cases not suitable for qualitative modelling is proposed. The proposed alternative combines neural networks and quantitative modelling.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Kenneth Aizawa (1999). Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):59-85.
  4. Michael A. Arbib (ed.) (2002). The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, Second Edition. MIT Press.
    A new, dramatically updated edition of the classic resource on the constantly evolving fields of brain theory and neural networks.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William P. Bechtel (1996). What Should a Connectionist Philosophy of Science Look Like? In The Churchlands and Their Critics. Oup.
    The reemergence of connectionism2 has profoundly altered the philosophy of mind. Paul Churchland has argued that it should equally transform the philosophy of science. He proposes that connectionism offers radical and useful new ways of understanding theories and explanations.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. William P. Bechtel (1996). The Churchlands and Their Critics. Oup.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. William P. Bechtel (1993). The Case for Connectionism. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):119-54.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William P. Bechtel (1993). The Path Beyond First-Order Connectionism. Mind and Language 8 (4):531-539.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William P. Bechtel (1988). Connectionism and Rules and Representation Systems: Are They Compatible? Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):5-16.
    The introduction of connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) systems to model cognitive functions has raised the question of the possible relations between these models and traditional information processing models which employ rules to manipulate representations. After presenting a brief account of PDP models and two ways in which they are commonly interpreted by those seeking to use them to explain cognitive functions, I present two ways one might relate these models to traditional information processing models and so not totally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. William P. Bechtel (1987). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26:17-41.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. William P. Bechtel (1986). What Happens to Accounts of Mind-Brain Relations If We Forgo an Architecture of Rules and Representations? Philosophy of Science Association 1986:159 - 171.
    The notion that the mind is a physical symbol system (Newell) with a determinate functional architecture (Pylyshyn) provides a compelling conception of the relation of cognitive inquiry to neuroscience inquiry: cognitive inquiry explores the activity within the symbol system while neuroscience explains how the symbol system is realized in the brain. However, the view the the mind is a physical symbol system is being challenged today by researchers in artificial intelligence who propose that the mind is a connectionist system and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. William P. Bechtel (1985). Contemporary Connectionism: Are the New Parallel Distributed Processing Models Cognitive or Associationist? Behaviorism 13:53-61.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William P. Bechtel (1985). Are the New PDP Models of Cognition Cognitivist or Associationist? Behaviorism 13:53-61.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. William P. Bechtel & Adele A. Abrahamsen (1992). Connectionism and the Future of Folk Psychology. In Robert G. Burton (ed.), Minds: Natural and Artificial. SUNY Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. William P. Bechtel & A. Abrahamson (1990). Beyond the Exclusively Propositional Era. Synthese 82 (2):223-53.
    Contemporary epistemology has assumed that knowledge is represented in sentences or propositions. However, a variety of extensions and alternatives to this view have been proposed in other areas of investigation. We review some of these proposals, focusing on (1) Ryle's notion of knowing how and Hanson's and Kuhn's accounts of theory-laden perception in science; (2) extensions of simple propositional representations in cognitive models and artificial intelligence; (3) the debate concerning imagistic versus propositional representations in cognitive psychology; (4) recent treatments of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. István S. N. Berkeley, Some Myths of Connectionism.
    Since the emergence of what Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) call 'new connectionism', there can be little doubt that connectionist research has become a significant topic for discussion in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. In addition to the numerous papers on the topic in philosophical journals, almost every recent book in these areas contain at least a brief reference to, or discussion of, the issues raised by connectionist research (see Sterelny 1990, Searle, 1992, and O Nualláin, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Istvan S. N. Berkeley, What is Connectionism?
    Connectionism is a style of modeling based upon networks of interconnected simple processing devices. This style of modeling goes by a number of other names too. Connectionist models are also sometimes referred to as 'Parallel Distributed Processing' (or PDP for short) models or networks.1 Connectionist systems are also sometimes referred to as 'neural networks' (abbreviated to NNs) or 'artificial neural networks' (abbreviated to ANNs). Although there may be some rhetorical appeal to this neural nomenclature, it is in fact misleading as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Istvan S. N. Berkeley, A Revisionist History of Connectionism.
    According to the standard (recent) history of connectionism (see for example the accounts offered by Hecht-Nielsen (1990: pp. 14-19) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988), or Papert's (1988: pp. 3-4) somewhat whimsical description), in the early days of Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CCTM) based AI research, there was also another allegedly distinct approach, one based upon network models. The work on network models seems to fall broadly within the scope of the term 'connectionist' (see Aizawa 1992), although the term had (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Susan J. Blackmore (2003). The Case of the Mysterious Mind: Review of Radiant Cool, by Dan Lloyd. [REVIEW] New Scientist 13:36-39.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Denny E. Bradshaw (1991). Connectionism and the Specter of Representationalism. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Robert G. Burton (ed.) (1992). Minds: Natural and Artificial. SUNY Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Drew Christie (1993). Comments on Bechtel's The Case for Connectionism. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):155-162.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Patricia S. Churchland & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1989). Neural Representation and Neural Computation. In L. Nadel (ed.), Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press.
  25. Paul M. Churchland (1989). On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Paul M. Churchland (1989). On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:59--101.
  27. Andy Clark (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  28. Andy Clark (1995). Connectionist Minds. In Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Andy Clark (1991). Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  30. Andy Clark (1990). Connectionism, Competence and Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (June):195-222.
    A competence model describes the abstract structure of a solution to some problem. or class of problems, facing the would-be intelligent system. Competence models can be quite derailed, specifying far more than merely the function to be computed. But for all that, they are pitched at some level of abstraction from the details of any particular algorithm or processing strategy which may be said to realize the competence. Indeed, it is the point and virtue of such models to specify some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Andy Clark (1989). Microcognition. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Andy Clark (1989). Microfunctionalism: Connectionism and the Scientific Explanation of Mental States. In A. Clark (ed.), Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing. MIT Press.
    This is an amended version of material that first appeared in A. Clark, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989), Ch. 1, 2, and 6. It appears in German translation in Metzinger,T (Ed) DAS LEIB-SEELE-PROBLEM IN DER ZWEITEN HELFTE DES 20 JAHRHUNDERTS (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1999).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Andy Clark & Chris Eliasmith (2002). Philosophical Issues in Brain Theory and Connectionism. In Michael A. Arbib (ed.), The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, Second Edition. Mit Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mark Collier (1999). Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects". Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
  35. Jack Copeland (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361-377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks unorganised machines. By the application of what he described as appropriate interference, mimicking education an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of neurons is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Robert C. Cummins (1995). Connectionist and the Rationale Constraint on Cognitive Explanations. Philosophical Perspectives 9:105-25.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Robert C. Cummins & Georg Schwarz (1991). Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Robert C. Cummins & Georg Schwarz (1987). Radical Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):43-61.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.
    In this paper, I define tacit knowledge as a kind of causal-explanatory structure, mirroring the derivational structure in the theory that is tacitly known. On this definition, tacit knowledge does not have to be explicitly represented. I then take the notion of a modular theory, and project the idea of modularity to several different levels of description: in particular, to the processing level and the neurophysiological level. The fundamental description of a connectionist network lies at a level between the processing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. S. Davis (ed.) (1992). Connectionism: Theory and Practice (Volume III of The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. Oxford University press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jane Duran & Ruth Doell (1993). Naturalized Epistemology, Connectionism and Biology. Dialectica 47 (4):327-336.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Manuel García-Carpintero (1995). The Philosophical Import of Connectionism: A Critical Notice of Andy Clark's Associative Engines. Mind and Language 10 (4):370-401.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gordon G. Globus (1992). Derrida and Connectionism: Differance in Neural Nets. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):183-97.
    A possible relation between Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics and connectionism is explored by considering diff rance in neural nets terms. First diff rance , as the crossing of Saussurian difference and Freudian deferral, is modeled and then the fuller 'sheaf of diff rance is taken up. The metaphysically conceived brain has two versions: in the traditional computational version the brain processes information like a computer and in the connectionist version the brain computes input vector to output vector transformations non-symbolically. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Robert F. Hadley (1999). Connectionism and Novel Combinations of Skills: Implications for Cognitive Architecture. Minds and Machines 9 (2):197-221.
    In the late 1980s, there were many who heralded the emergence of connectionism as a new paradigm – one which would eventually displace the classically symbolic methods then dominant in AI and Cognitive Science. At present, there remain influential connectionists who continue to defend connectionism as a more realistic paradigm for modeling cognition, at all levels of abstraction, than the classical methods of AI. Not infrequently, one encounters arguments along these lines: given what we know about neurophysiology, it is just (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Gary Hatfield (1990). Gibsonian Representations and Connectionist Symbol-Processing: Prospects for Unification. Psychological Research 52:243-52.
  46. Dianne D. Horgan & Douglas J. Hacker (1999). Beginning a Theoretician-Practitioner Dialogue About Connectionism. Acta Analytica 22 (22):261-273.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Terence E. Horgan (1999). Short Prcis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):9-21.
  48. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):365-371.
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1999). Authors' Replies. Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Glyn W. Humphreys (1986). Information-Processing Systems Which Embody Computational Rules: The Connectionist Approach. Mind and Language 1 (3):201-12.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Alistair Isaac & Jakub Szymanik (2010). Logic in Cognitive Science: Bridging the Gap Between Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (2):279-309.
    This paper surveys applications of logical methods in the cognitive sciences. Special attention is paid to non-monotonic logics and complexity theory. We argue that these particular tools have been useful in clarifying the debate between symbolic and connectionist models of cognition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Brian L. Keeley (2006). Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. David Kirsh (1992). PDP Learnability and Innate Knowledge of Language. In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theory and practice (Volume III of The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. Oxford University press.
    It is sometimes argued that if PDP networks can be trained to make correct judgements of grammaticality we have an existence proof that there is enough information in the stimulus to permit learning grammar by inductive means alone. This seems inconsistent superficially with Gold's theorem and at a deeper level with the fact that networks are designed on the basis of assumptions about the domain of the function to be learned. To clarify the issue I consider what we should learn (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Aarre Laakso & Garrison W. Cottrell (2006). Churchland on Connectionism. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. C. R. Legg (1988). Connectionism and Physiological Psychology: A Marriage Made in Heaven? Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):263-78.
    Abstract Physiological psychology has its conceptual roots in stimulus?response behaviourism. The resurgence of cognitive concepts in mainstream psychology has led to a separation between the two, largely due to the failure of most cognitive theories to specify how their explanatory processes could be realised in the nervous system. Connectionism looks as if it may be able to bridge this gap. The problem is that connectionism takes a radically different view of the brain from that adopted in traditional physiological psychology. This (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  59. Mary Litch (1999). Learning Connectionist Networks and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):87-110.
  60. Mary Litch (1997). Computation, Connectionism and Modelling the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):357-364.
    Any analysis of the concept of computation as it occurs in the context of a discussion of the computational model of the mind must be consonant with the philosophic burden traditionally carried by that concept as providing a bridge between a physical and a psychological description of an agent. With this analysis in hand, one may ask the question: are connectionist-based systems consistent with the computational model of the mind? The answer depends upon which of several versions of connectionism one (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Dan Lloyd (1994). Connectionist Hysteria: Reducing a Freudian Case Study to a Network Model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):69-88.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Dan Lloyd (1989). Parallel Distributed Processing and Cognition: Only Connect? In Simple Minds. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Dan Lloyd (1989). Simple Minds. MIT Press.
    Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. William G. Lycan (1991). Homuncular Functionalism Meets PDP. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
  66. Brian P. McLaughlin (1987). Tye on Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 185 (S1):185-193.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Stephen L. Mills (1993). Wittgenstein and Connectionism: A Significant Complementarity? Philosophy 34:137-157.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Nenad Miscevic (1994). Connectionism and Epistemic Value. Acta Analytica 12 (12):19-37.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. L. Nadel (ed.) (1989). Neural Connections, Mental Computations. MIT Press.
  70. Thomas J. Nenon (1994). Connectionism and Phenomenology. In Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Thomas J. Nenon (1994). Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. L. F. Niklasson & Tim van Gelder, Can Connectionist Models Exhibit Non-Classical Structure Sensitivity?
    Department of Computer Science Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences University of Skövde, S-54128, SWEDEN Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2002). Radical Connectionism: Thinking with (Not in) Language. Language and Communication 22 (3):313-329.
    In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  74. Jonathan Opie (1998). Connectionist Modelling Strategies. Psycoloquy 9 (30).
    Green offers us two options: either connectionist models are literal models of brain activity or they are mere instruments, with little or no ontological significance. According to Green, only the first option renders connectionist models genuinely explanatory. I think there is a third possibility. Connectionist models are not literal models of brain activity, but neither are they mere instruments. They are abstract, IDEALISED models of the brain that are capable of providing genuine explanations of cognitive phenomena.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2006). How Do Connectionist Networks Compute? Cognitive Processing 7 (1):30-41.
    Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. Gualtiero Piccinini (ed.) (2007). Proceedings of the 2007 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Connectionist Computation. In Gualtiero Piccinini (ed.), Proceedings of the 2007 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks.
    The following three theses are inconsistent: (1) (Paradigmatic) connectionist systems perform computations. (2) Performing computations requires executing programs. (3) Connectionist systems do not execute programs. Many authors embrace (2). This leads them to a dilemma: either connectionist systems execute programs or they don't compute. Accordingly, some authors attempt to deny (1), while others attempt to deny (3). But as I will argue, there are compelling reasons to accept both (1) and (3). So, we should replace (2) with a more satisfactory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  78. Ullin T. Place (1999). Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness. Acta Analytica 22 (22):197-226.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. Kim Plunkett (2001). Connectionism Today. Synthese 129 (2):185-194.
    Connectionist networks have been used to model a wide range of cognitivephenomena, including developmental, neuropsychological and normal adultbehaviours. They have offered radical alternatives to traditional accounts ofwell-established facts about cognition. The primary source of the success ofthese models is their sensitivity to statistical regularities in their trainingenvironment. This paper provides a brief description of the connectionisttoolbox and how this has developed over the past 2 decades, with particularreference to the problem of reading aloud.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. William Ramsey & Stephen P. Stich (1990). Connectionism and Three Levels of Nativism. Synthese 82 (2):177-205.
    Along with the increasing popularity of connectionist language models has come a number of provocative suggestions about the challenge these models present to Chomsky's arguments for nativism. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. We begin by reconstructing Chomsky's argument from the poverty of the stimulus and arguing that it is best understood as three related arguments, with increasingly strong conclusions. Next, we provide a brief introduction to connectionism and give a quick survey of recent efforts to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.) (1991). Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Jay F. Rosenberg (1989). Connectionism and Cognition. Bielefeld Report.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  83. Scott R. Sehon (1998). Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
    It is widely assumed that common sense psychological explanations of human action are a species of causal explanation. I argue against this construal, drawing on Ramsey et al.'s paper, “Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology”. I argue that if certain connec-tionist models are correct, then mental states cannot be identified with functionally discrete causes of behavior, and I respond to some recent attempts to deny this claim. However, I further contend that our common sense psychological practices are not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Benny Shanon (1992). Are Connectionist Models Cognitive? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
    In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  85. Barry Smith (1997). The Connectionist Mind: A Study of Hayekian Psychology. In Stephen F. Frowen (ed.), Hayek: Economist and Social Philosopher: A Critical Retrospect. St. Martin's Press.
    Introduction I shall begin my remarks with some discussion of recent work in cognitive science, and the participants in this meeting might find it useful to note that I might equally well have chosen as title of my paper something like 'Artificial Intelligence and the Free Market Order'. They might care to note also that I am, as far as the achievements and goals of research in artificial intelligence are concerned, something of a sceptic. My appeal to cognitive science in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. Herman E. Stark (1994). Connectionism and the Form of Rational Norms. Acta Analytica 12 (12):39-53.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Kim Sterelny (1990). Connectionism. In The Representational Theory of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Kim Sterelny (1990/1991). The Representational Theory of Mind. Blackwell.
  89. Paul R. Thagard (1989). Connectionism and Epistemology: Goldman on Winner-Take-All Networks. Philosophia 19 (2-3):189-196.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. John L. Tienson (1987). Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 1:1-16.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. Tim van Gelder (1993). Connectionism and the Mind-Body Problem: Exposing the Distinction Between Mind and Cognition. Artificial Intelligence Review 7:355-369.