In this article, we offer a critical realist conception of curriculum that aims to cultivate critical thinking (CT) and liberate students from egocentric rationality. We first examine egocentric rationality as a problem emerging from the technicist paradigm of cultivating CT in higher education, exemplified by issues arising from the pedagogical activity of debate. We then examine existing approaches to cultivating CT, focusing on the extent to which their goals and conceptions of CT could liberate students from egocentric rationality. Drawing on (...) Roy Bhaskar’s stratified conception of being and principle of immanent critique, we offer a critical realist conception of curriculum, explaining its definition of CT as the capacity for self-critique. We shall illustrate, in the context of an undergraduate debate course, how such capacity can be developed in order to liberate students from egocentric rationality. Curriculum is thus a critical praxis, a created space where student’s CT develops in a way that is intrinsically entwined with their being and becoming. This article extends the philosophical basis for integrating CT with curriculum and offers pedagogical implications. (shrink)

In Archytas of Tarentum, Carl Huffman reconstructs Archytas’ theory of definition by linking definitions to the mathematical study of ratios and proportions. This paper considers whether and how Archytas used definitions and whether he possessed a theory of definition. Our evidence does not support the claim that Archytas has a theory of definition, and his approach to the science of harmonics suggests that he relied on analogies and proportions in the practice of inquiry. We understand sounds and other entities by (...) placing them in a network of relations governed by mathematical proportions. Although he does not seem to have formulated definitions of sound, Archytas pursued inquiry into motion and rest by formulating definitions in such a way that they fit into a larger network of causal explanations. (shrink)

For several decades, scholars of Plato's dialogues have focussed their efforts on understanding Socrates’ philosophy by unravelling the arguments used to establish it. On this view, Socrates’ philosophy is presented in his arguments, and, as Gregory Vlastos says, ‘Almost everything Socrates says is wiry argument; that is the beauty of his talk for a philosopher.’ In this paper I raise questions about what can be learned about Socrates’ philosophy through analysis of his arguments. One critic of what he views as (...) traditional interpretations of Plato—‘the sole frame of reference used by most interpreters of Plato from antiquity to the present’—describes this approach as follows: reading the dialogues to discover Platonic or Socratic doctrines, andthe logic of the arguments on which these doctrines are based.While I subscribe to the first point, I have questions about, the ready contention that Plato's dogmas are based on the arguments through which they are defended in dialogues. (shrink)

In this article I analyze the speech of the Laws in Plato’s Crito from a jurisprudential perspective. More specifically I explore the Laws’ views about the authority of law. I offer new interpretations of their famous ‘persuade or obey’ alternative and of their arguments about their superior moral status and the agreements of the citizens with them. I also explore the rather neglected topic of the mental attitude towards their authority that they demand from the citizens and conclude with a (...) discussion of their understanding of the relation between law and morality. I approach the speech of the Laws as a historian of legal thought and try to locate their arguments firmly within both the context of the ancient Athenian legal system and the context of Platonic philosophy. (shrink)