This paper presents the view that tropes can change, and so are not individuated by their determinate qualitative characters. On the view I have in mind, a trope is at any given time fully determinate, but can change qualitatively within the bounds set by a determinable essence. A charge trope, for example, must at any time have some exact intensity, but can survive changes in intensity. My argument, roughly, is this: Objects can change, and tropes are the parts of objects (...) that change (in a special sense of ‘part’), so tropes can change too. After some preliminaries, I present the argument carefully and discuss the operant notions. I then discuss each premise in turn. I respond to the charge that the view isn't realist, and to objections based on identity‐conditions for tropes. I describe both substratum‐ and bundle‐theoretic versions of the view, and finally, show what the view buys us. (shrink)

The article places Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and his position on the ontological status of artifacts against the Medieval philosophical background. It is concluded that Suárez is an artifact realist. However, Suárez’ realism concerning artifacts is of a minimalist kind. Inscribing himself into the realist tradition, Suárez affirms that an artifact has an “artificial form”, a ‘forma artificialis’. However, this form is not a thing in its own right, but rather has the status of a _mode_. Further, the artificial form is (...) not a mode of substance, but rather of quantity. Hence, Suárez can rightly be called a minimal realist concerning artifacts. In an additional section, the role of the exemplar in the production of an artifact is explored. Suárez counts the exemplar among the efficient causes, and so, the exemplar in the mind of the artisan is one of many efficient causes that together produce and determine the artifact. (shrink)