Abstract

There is no dispute over the existence of functions and processes that operate outside consciousness. No one knows what his or her liver is doing, and we all shed a tear when Lassie comes home, even though we know we are watching a movie with a dog who responds to off‐camera signals. Where matters become interesting (and contentious) is over such issues as whether unconscious processes are routinized and inflexible – in a word, stupid – or whether they can be seen as sophisticated, flexible, and adaptive – in a word, intelligent. In the cognitive sciences, until recently, the former perspective dominated for reasons which are rooted not in any objective data base, but in philosophical considerations. The long‐standing presumption of a not‐very‐bright unconscious is, we suspect, the end product of a continuing adherence to Lockean and Cartesian epistemic traditions. While proponents of these two orientations didn't agree on much, they were of one mind with regard to the proposition that that which is mental is conscious. Contemporary psychologists and philosophers who feel comfortable with this position tend to view unconscious cognitive processes as low‐level, crude, primitively connectionistic, and rather stupid, since they equate sophisticated control operations with the functions of consciousness.