Discernibility of the Meaning of Life: Reconstructing Tabatabai’s view

پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 14 (2):1-23 (2017)
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Abstract

The belief in discernibility of the meaning of life is the idea that the meaning of life exists and Can be discovered. Although Tabatabaie has not explicitly addressed the issue, there are pieces of evidence which imply that he believes in discernibility of the meaning of life. Tabatabaie believes that action, subject, and the purpose exist as a unified existence. The purpose is a higher stage in the hierarchy of ontology. The purpose of human life is the result of divine guidance and requires the unity of the divine action. Analysis of this evidence shows that Tabatabaie believes in ontological realism, rationalism, teleology and the capability of human beings in finding the truth in their life which reveal his view about the discernibility. So Tabatabaie’s theory about the meaning of life is a kind of objectivist theories and is far from subjectivism.

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