Abstract

The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education from two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge.