International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568 (2008)
|Abstract||In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I conclude that Silverstein has not shown that an appeal to four-dimensionalism facilitates a refutation of Epicurus, although a consideration of some of Silverstein's points helps to indicate the limited scope of the Epicurean thesis.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Harry S. Silverstein (1998). More Pain or Less? Comments on Broome. Analysis 58 (2):146–151.
Harry S. Silverstein (1973). A Correction to Smyth's 'Better'. Analysis 34 (2):55 - 56.
Harry S. Silverstein (1983). Assenting to "Ought" Judgments. Noûs 17 (2):159-182.
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.) (2010). Time and Identity. Mit Press.
Michael Martin, Henry Ruf & Harry S. Silverstein (1972). Silverstein's Defense of Cornman. Philosophical Studies 23 (5):319 - 323.
Harry Silverstein (2010). The Time of the Evil of Death. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
Harry Silverstein (2008). 'The Evil of Death' Defended: Reply to Burley. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):569 – 579.
Harry S. Silverstein (1980). The Evil of Death. Journal of Philosophy 77 (7):401-424.
Harry S. Silverstein (2000). The Evil of Death Revisited. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):116–134.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #21,913 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,645 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?