Paraconsistency and knowability

Abstract

We propose a modal paraconsistent logic sound and complete in order to create a model where the premisses of the knowability paradox are true except the conclusion.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

Knowability, possibility and paradox.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 270-299.
Combining possibility and knowledge.Alexandre Costa-Leite - manuscript
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
On keeping blue swans and unknowable facts at bay : a case study on Fitch's paradox.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Knowability and the capacity to know.Author unknown - manuscript
Closure on knowability.Mark Jago - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
Truth and the enigma of knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Not every truth can be known (at least, not all at once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
15 (#929,240)

6 months
1 (#1,506,218)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references