David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press 339--354 (2009)
According to the “knowability thesis,” every truth is knowable. Fitch’s paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. In this paper, I propose a weakening of the knowability thesis (which I call the “conjunctive knowability thesis”) to the e:ect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. I show that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very di:erently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak
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Citations of this work BETA
Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri (2013). The Church–Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
Christopher Gregory Weaver (2013). A Church-Fitch Proof for the Universality of Causation. Synthese 190 (14):2749-2772.
Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
Michael Fara (2010). Knowability and the Capacity to Know. Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
Martin Fischer (2013). Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
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