Thought, experimental phenomenon and experiment according to pragmaticism

Trans/Form/Ação 7:49-59 (1984)
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Abstract

The Pragmaticism of Charles Sanders Peirce, as a general theory of conception, is a theory of sign and a theory of thought. Limiting itself on the consideration of the "rational purport" of symbols, the Pragmaticism seeks to establish the kind of causation atribuitive to thought: an efficient causation centralized in perception and experiment and a final causation determining a rational habit of conduct before the general class of experimental phenomena represented by the concept.O Pragmaticismo de Charles Sanders Peirce, como teoria geral da concepção, e uma teoria do signo e uma teoria do pensamento. Limitando-se à consideração do "teor racional" dos símbolos, o pragmaticismo procura estabelecer o tipo de causação atribuível ao pensamento: uma causação eficiente centralizada na percepção e no experimento e uma causação final que determina um hábito racional de conduta diante da classe geral de fenômenos experimentais representada no conceito

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