Abstract

This article is a continuation of “Mobility and Solidarity. Paper One”. Solidarity is considered from the point of view of co-intended meaning, as an additional motive accompanying the main motivation of participants of interaction, and at the exhaustion of the initial motive, replacing this motive. An example of such a motive in elementary interactions is fidelity. Fidelity, according to Georg Simmel, enables participants to make logical induction from the facts of the current behavior to the expected behavior of partners. Other type of communication concerning solidarity is civil friendship, as described, in particular, by Aristotle. However any friendship presupposes too narrow and too specific circles of contacts, it can be only a prototype of modern solidarity. Religious ethics of fraternal affection and ethics of military brotherhood compete with friendship and often force it out. The more friendships are free from “world orders”, the more they come nearer to the type of pure solidarity. The exchange of gifts can be considered as another type of solidarity, though in modern societies it has only limited potential of universality. The most important phenomenon of modern mobile society is pure togetherness. Here solidarity is present as an imputed motive, one of the accepted vocabularies of motives, and often invoked post hoc to explain why those who aren’t forced to it by power, money, or value commitments stay together