Online research in philosophy

David Lewis has tried to explain what it is for a possible language to be the actual language of a population in terms of his game-theoretical notion of a convention. This explanation of the actual language relation is re-evaluated in the light of some typical episodes of linguistic communication, and it is argued that speakers of a language do not generally stand in the actual language relation to that language if the actual language relation is explicated in Lewis's way. In order to avoid these counterexamples, an alternative account of the actual language relation is proposed which makes use of Lewis's notion of convention in a different way.

Abstract As a moral philosopher Iris Murdoch has emphasized that the identification and description of our inner states of being should once more become part of the data of ethics, as it was in traditional ethics. There has been, in fact, an over?emphasis on such activities as ?making choices? and ?giving reasons?. I attempt to argue in this paper that Iris Murdoch does not simply imply a theory of language usage, but believes that the task of moral philosophers should be to try to describe our personal struggles to express our inner moral experience. She argues that the metaphor, as central to a living language, plays a vital part in this attempt. I try to show how important this view of the inner meaning of language is for both identity and culture, and to indicate the educational implications.

Abstract This essay considers the ways in which language mediates and shapes moral experience. It suggests that language and forms of discourse are essential to psychological functioning, because words (and other signs and symbols) provide the ?tools? necessary for thinking, feeling and acting. As a result, understanding how language mediates the functioning of the psyche is prerequisite to understanding the ways in which narrative expresses and represents moral experience and moral functioning. This essay also explores the implications of this view for the study of moral development and the practice of moral education.

That both language and novel life-history stages are unique to humans is an interesting datum. But failure to distinguish between language and language use results in an exaggeration of the language acquisition period, which in turn vitiates claims that new developmental stages were causative factors in language evolution.

The anti-capitalist debate has traditionally drawn up battle lines between oppressed individuals on the one hand, and an oppressive system on the other. While this has high rhetorical value, it is based on imprecise use of language. The language confuses an amoral system with im/moral agents but at the same time uses anthropomorphic language to lend capitalism moral agency. This inevitably leads to a confused debate. Given that all opponents of capitalism want the reformation of what they see as a flawed system, precision in the use of the language employed would move the debate into arenas of action, and thus the debate is more likely to generate change.

The aim of this article is twofold. Against the traditional interpretation of ‘the conscience of Huckleberry Finn’ (for which Jonathan Bennett's article with this title is the locus classicus) as a conflict between conscience and sympathy, I propose a new interpretation of Huck's inner conflict, in terms of Huck's mastery of (the) moral language and its integration with his moral feelings. The second aim is to show how this interpretation can provide insight into a particular aspect of moral education: learning a moral language. A moral education that has a proper regard for the flexibility of moral language and the importance of the integration of moral language and (pre-)moral feelings should prevent such conflicts as Huck experienced from arising.

The Limits of Language concerns itself with the nature and limits of language at a time when our understanding of the world and of ourselves is intimately related to what we understand of language.

Legitimate confusion over the use of the language of character arises over the topic of that language and its relation to the concepts of story and community often associated with it. This essay argues that the proper topic of the language of character is the self in relation, and that a phenomenology of the self in relation is the first step in an ethics of character. Four elements of character are thus described, and a consideration of the role of story and community in the formation of character over time points the way to the use of the language of character in practical moral reflection.

Many an adult Ugandan probably employs the language of morals more or less unconsciously but frequently in everyday conversation. But, how do some Ugandans use language when they say of some things in a moral sense that it is good or right, because is not a matter related to corruption, bad or wrong, since it is a corruption-related issue? The author endeavours to analyse a given language that many Ugandans use when confronted with situations and/or facts of corruption and when they make moral judgements about these situations and facts from a metaethical perspective. He confirms that what he terms a language of corruption exists in Uganda and is employed to condone or approve corrupt acts in certain circumstances. That language of corruption, the author recommends, should not be regarded as amoral, but as moral in character and it must be addressed as such.