Online research in philosophy

Conceptions of analytic truth -- Hume's fork -- Kant and the analytic/synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori propositions -- Bolzano and analyticity -- Analyticity in frege -- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions -- The Vienna circle -- Carnap and logical empiricism -- Carnap and Quine -- Demise of the aufbau -- Philosophy as logical syntax -- Logical and descriptive languages -- Physical languages -- Analyticity in syntax -- Carnap's move to semantics -- Explications -- Analyticity in a semantic setting -- Eliminating metaphysics : Carnap's final try -- W.V. Quine : explication is elimination -- Behaviorists ex officio -- Analyticity in the crosshairs -- Analyticity and its discontents -- Questioning analyticity -- Quine's two dogmas of empiricism -- Objections to the coherence of analytic -- Quine's coherence arguments : Carnap's reply -- Other responses to the coherence objection : Grice and Strawson on Quine -- A second dogma of empiricism -- Responses to the existence objections to analyticity -- Analyticity by convention -- Quine's developed attitude toward analyticity -- Analyticity and ontology -- Quine's naturalized ontology -- The indeterminacy of translation -- Some consequences of the indeterminacy arguments : ontological relativity and analyticity -- Responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments -- Carnap's empiricism, semantics, and ontology -- Some Quinean and other responses to empiricism, semantics, and ontology -- Some recent connections between conceptual truths and ontology -- Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, causality, and exists -- Eli Hirsch and Ted Sider on mereological principles -- The Canberra Project : a resurrection of Carnap's aufbau -- Analyticity and epistemology -- Analytic truths and their role in epistemology : the classical position -- Objecting to the classical position -- Bonjour on moderate empiricism -- Quine's epistemology naturalized -- Quine and evidence : responses to circularity -- Kripke on a priority, analyticity, and necessity -- Analyticity repositioned -- The concept analytic -- One type of statement that might be reasonably called analytic -- Aside on two dimensionalism -- Analyticity and T-analyticity -- How analyticity avoids many common objections to analyticity -- Some brief comments on two other approaches to analyticity -- Mathematical claims as T-analytic -- A further potential application : pure and impure stipulata.

Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, I resist Ebert’s reasons for thinking that Boghossian’s argument fails to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion.

Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular, it will also do away with truth. I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the type of argument he himself advanced in “Two Dogmas” against Carnap’s notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that.

Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.

Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.

The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and constitutive. It concludes by outlining a theory of the latter.

The paper argues that the theory of Implicit Definition cannot give an account of knowledge of logical principles. According to this theory, the meanings of certain expressions are determined such that they make certain principles containing them true; this is supposed to explain our knowledge of the principles as derived from our knowledge of what the expressions mean. The paper argues that this explanation succeeds only if Implicit Definition can account for our understanding of the logical constants, and that fully understanding a logical constant in turn requires the ability to apply it correctly in particular cases. It is shown, however, that Implicit Definition cannot account for this ability, even if it draws on introduction rules for the logical constants. In particular, Implicit Definition cannot account for our ability to apply negation in particular cases. Owing to constraints relating to the unique characterisation of logical constants, invoking the notion of rejection does not remedy the situation. Given its failure to explain knowledge of logic, the prospects of Implicit Definition to explain other kinds of a priori knowledge are even worse.

In an important recent discussion of analyticity, Paul Boghossian (1997)1 argues for the following three claims: (i) While Quine’s well-known arguments against analyticity do undermine one type of analyticity (what Boghossian calls metaphysical analyticity), they fail to undermine another type (what he calls epistemic analyticity). (ii) Epistemic analyticity explains the a prioricity of logic and perhaps even the a prioricity of conceptual truths.

This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth, and the analytic theory of a priori knowledge.

Conceptions of analytic truth -- Hume's fork -- Kant and the analytic/synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori propositions -- Bolzano and analyticity -- Analyticity in frege -- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions -- The Vienna circle -- Carnap and logical empiricism -- Carnap and Quine -- Demise of the aufbau -- Philosophy as logical syntax -- Logical and descriptive languages -- Physical languages -- Analyticity in syntax -- Carnap's move to semantics -- Explications -- Analyticity in a semantic setting -- Eliminating metaphysics : Carnap's final try -- W.V. Quine : explication is elimination -- Behaviorists ex officio -- Analyticity in the crosshairs -- Analyticity and its discontents -- Questioning analyticity -- Quine's two dogmas of empiricism -- Objections to the coherence of analytic -- Quine's coherence arguments : Carnap's reply -- Other responses to the coherence objection : Grice and Strawson on Quine -- A second dogma of empiricism -- Responses to the existence objections to analyticity -- Analyticity by convention -- Quine's developed attitude toward analyticity -- Analyticity and ontology -- Quine's naturalized ontology -- The indeterminacy of translation -- Some consequences of the indeterminacy arguments : ontological relativity and analyticity -- Responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments -- Carnap's empiricism, semantics, and ontology -- Some Quinean and other responses to empiricism, semantics, and ontology -- Some recent connections between conceptual truths and ontology -- Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, causality, and exists -- Eli Hirsch and Ted Sider on mereological principles -- The Canberra Project : a resurrection of Carnap's aufbau -- Analyticity and epistemology -- Analytic truths and their role in epistemology : the classical position -- Objecting to the classical position -- Bonjour on moderate empiricism -- Quine's epistemology naturalized -- Quine and evidence : responses to circularity -- Kripke on a priority, analyticity, and necessity -- Analyticity repositioned -- The concept analytic -- One type of statement that might be reasonably called analytic -- Aside on two dimensionalism -- Analyticity and T-analyticity -- How analyticity avoids many common objections to analyticity -- Some brief comments on two other approaches to analyticity -- Mathematical claims as T-analytic -- A further potential application : pure and impure stipulata.