'Good,' 'doog,' and naturalism in ethics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34:437-439 (1974)
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Abstract

R M HARE HAS CLAIMED THAT ALL NATURALISTIC ETHICAL\nTHEORIES ARE INCORRECT BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF\nTHE COMMENDING FUNCTION OF ETHICAL TERMS. BUT HARE ASSUMES\nTHE POINT AT ISSUE BY SUPPOSING THAT NO DEFINING\nCHARACTERISTICS COULD THEMSELVES BE TAKEN AS COMMENDATORY.\nIF 'X IS GOOD' IS TAKEN TO MEAN 'AN INFORMED,\nDISINTERESTED, RATIONAL, NORMAL HUMAN SPECTATOR WOULD\nAPPROVE OF X', THEN THE DEFINIENS WOULD BE JUST AS\nCOMMENDATORY AS THE DEFINIENDUM

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