Abstract

By reappraising the biological theory of vitalism, Canguilhem attempted to give pride of place to the idea that acquiring knowledge about living beings is an activity of living beings. He is indeed credited with the view that knowledge in particular and rationality in general are “tied to a conception of life” whereby “life predominantly manifests itself in organic individuals that act and react within specific environments which, in turn, are defined by the needs and desires of these individuals” (Schmidgen H. Hist Philos Life Sci, 36(2): 4, 2014. doi:10.1007/s40656-014-0030-1). These needs and desires, we are told, constitute “un système de référence irréductible et par là absolu” (Canguilhem G. Le vivant et son milieu. In: La connaissance de la vie (Deuxième édition revue et augmenté). Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 129–154, 1992c). Canguilhem’s legacy is exactly this: rationality is rooted in life, and not the other way around. And yet, in “Le concept et la vie” (from 1966) and “De la science et de la contre-science” (from 1971), Canguilhem seems to tell another story about the complex intertwinement of life and rationality. Not only are we condemned to enter the realm of rationality (i.e., to take part in logical activities such as forming concepts and judgments about the world and about our own condition) because we have needs and desires as living beings, but we also have needs and desires as living beings that depend on the fact we are always already caught-up in the dynamics of rationality, i.e., always already logically active. At this point, Canguilhem’s thinking comes closer than ever to a Kantian, transcendental point of view on rationality. Paradoxically, the inscription of human rationality in organic life brings with it the idea of a subject, divided between two inverse but correlated realms in which it cannot but participate: the singular realm of sensibility and the general realm of logic.