This paper argues that the contextual approach to natural selection does not offer an estimation of the contributions of individual and group selection to evolutionary change in multi-level selection scenarios, and that this is so because the term “group selection”, as defined by the contextual approach, does not refer to a process taking place at the group level. In the contextual analysis framework, this term simply denotes an evolutionary change that takes place due to the fact that, overall, individual types (...) do not share similar contexts or environments, and the only way to claim that such an evolutionary change is a result of selection is by admitting that “group selection” is in fact a kind of frequency-dependent selection, i.e. a selection process taking place at the individual level. Therefore, under the names “individual selection” and “group selection”, the contextual approach actually isolates two aspects of the relation between individual types and their environment, and not two distinct levels of selection. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify two general positions with respect to the relationship between environment and natural selection. These positions consist in claiming that selective claims need and, respectively, need not be relativized to homogenous environments. I then show that adopting one or the other position makes a difference with respect to the way in which the effects of selection are to be measured in certain cases in which the focal population is distributed over heterogeneous environments. Moreover, I show that (...) these two positions lead to two different interpretations—the Pricean and contextualist ones—of a type of selection scenarios in which multiple groups varying in properties affect the change in the metapopulation mean of individual-level traits. Showing that these two interpretations stem from different attitudes towards environmental homogeneity allows me to argue: that, unlike the Pricean interpretation, the contextualist interpretation can only claim that drift or selection is responsible for the change in frequency of the focal trait in a given metapopulation if details about whether or not group formation is random are specified; that the traditional main objection against the Pricean interpretation—consisting in arguing that the latter takes certain side-effects of individual selection to be effects of group selection—is unconvincing. This leads me to suggest that the ongoing debate about which of the two interpretations is preferable should concentrate on different issues than previously thought. (shrink)

In this short paper, I argue against what I call the “belonging to” interpretation of group selection in scenarios in which a group’s fitness is defined as the per capita reproductive output of the individuals of the group. According to this interpretation, group selection acts on “belonging to” properties of individuals, i.e. on relational or contextual properties that all the individuals of a group share simply by belonging to that group; thus, if differences in the individuals’ “belonging to” properties cause (...) differences in their fitness, group selection sensu the “belonging to” interpretation is said to be at work. I argue that the main problem with the “belonging to” interpretation is that it confuses evolutionary changes due to differences in environmental quality with evolutionary changes due to selection. In other words, I argue that, in the majority of cases, this interpretation actually takes the “selection” out of the “group selection” notion it aims to interpret: by adopting this perspective, one implicitly commits to explaining the evolutionary change under consideration not by a kind of selection, but by differences in the environmental quality experienced by individual types. (shrink)

In "Some Criticism of the Contextual Approach, and a Few Proposals" in Biological Theory, Brian McLoone discusses some of the points about the contextual approach that I made in a recent paper. Besides offering a reply to McLoone’s comments on my paper, in this article I show why McLoone’s discussion of the two main frameworks for thinking about group selection—the contextual and the Price approach—is partly misguided. In particular, I show that one of McLoone’s main arguments against the contextual approach (...) is missing the target and that one of his (and Elliott Sober’s) arguments in defense of the Price approach is flawed. Criticizing these arguments will help me present an entirely different picture than McLoone’s of the current status of multilevel selection theory. More precisely, I argue that the idea that we are dealing with "multilevel selection" in the type of multigroup cases in which the focal units are the individuals (and their traits) has recently come under threat. Finally, I discuss the ways in which this idea might be salvaged by appealing either to the contextual or to the Price approach. (shrink)

There is surprisingly little philosophical work on conceptually spelling out the difference between the traits on which natural selection may be said to act (e.g. “having a high running speed”) and mere circumstantial traits (e.g. “happening to be in the path of a forest fire”). I label this issue the “selectable traits problem” and, in this paper, I propose a solution for it. I first show that, contrary to our first intuition, simply equating selectable traits with heritable ones is not (...) an adequate solution. I then go on to argue that two recent philosophical solutions to this problem—due to Peter Godfrey-Smith and Pierrick Bourrat—are unconvincing because they cannot accommodate frequency-dependent selection. The way out of this difficulty is, I argue, to accept that extrinsic properties dependent on relations between intrinsic properties of the population members should also count as selectable traits. I then show that my proposal is legitimized by more than the simple accommodation of frequency-dependent selection. (shrink)

This paper outlines a hypothesis regarding the close connection between two problems in Georges Canguilhem’s work. The first problem is that of Canguilhem’s insistence to include considerations about natural selection in his work and of the role that this notion could play therein. The second problem consists in Canguilhem’s tendency to often use the term “life” as the subject of his sentences, even though this tendency may seem to at least partially contradict some of the central theses advanced in his (...) philosophy. This paper attempts to show that these two problems should not be viewed as being isolated from one another, that there is a strong connection between the two and that a certain interpretation of the first one allows us to make sense of the second. To put it otherwise, the aim of this paper is to show that a particular interpretation of the role of natural selection in Canguilhem’s work could help explain why “life” plays the role of a preferred grammatical subject in his writings. (shrink)

This paper argues that Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussion of violence from his Notebooks for an ethics constitutes an attempt to go beyond an instrumental view of violence. An “instrumental view of violence” essentially assumes that violent behavior is a form of pragmatic behavior whose distinguishing feature consists in the kind of means one employs for reaching one’s goals (violent behavior resorting to means that are harmful for others, whereas non-violent behavior does not). For his part, Sartre attempts to provide a stronger (...) demarcation between violent and pragmatic behaviors. First, violent behavior is, for Sartre, not necessarily characterized by the use of particular means, but by a particular manner of using means, one that involves a certain “forcing” or “straining” of the means. Second, I argue that, according to Sartre, in contrast with pragmatic behavior, violent behavior involves a modification of one’s attitude towards one’s goals. Three such modified attitudes with respect to one’s goals are detailed here, namely the non-productive attitude (the assumption that the goal is not to be produced or that it is not to be produced by means that are under our control), the counter-productive attitude (the exacerbation of one’s proximate goal at the expense of more distant goals) and the anti-productive attitude (the active refusal of one’s previously set goal). Moreover, I show that Sartre’s view that violence involves the “straining” of one’s means is undergirded by his idea that violent behavior presupposes the modification of one’s attitude with respect to one’s goals. (shrink)

It has become customary in multilevel selection theory to use the same terms to denote both two explanatory goals and two explanatory means. This paper spells out some of the benefits that derive from avoiding this terminological conflation. I argue that keeping explanatory means and goals well apart allows us to see that, contrary to a popular recent idea, Price’s equation and contextual analysis—the statistical methods most extensively used for measuring the effects of certain evolutionary factors on the change in (...) the focal individual trait in multilevel selection scenarios—do not come with built-in notions of group selection and, therefore, the efficacy of these methods at analyzing various kinds of cases does not constitute a basis for deciding how group selection should best be defined. Moreover, contrary to another widely accepted idea, I argue that more than one type of group selection may serve as explanatory means when one’s goal is that of explaining the evolution of individual traits in multilevel selection scenarios and I spell out how this explanatory role should be understood. (shrink)

This paper attempts to put some order among the different notions of pain that are to be found in the Nietzschean philosophical corpus. It tries to show that there is a mutation of the Nietzschean concept of pain, from the notion of pain as evaluation to that of pain as localization of a commotion. Therefore pain is not in itself the source of a reaction, but is actually a consequence of a commotion that a reaction has already addressed by the (...) time of the appearance of pain. A deeper notion of pain is therefore sketched here, one that depicts it as an illusory reaction, destined at separating the global commotion of the organism from its alleged localized cause, thus separating the action from the agent and postponing the facing of the global effect of the commotion. It is for this reason that pain becomes a kind of “matrix” for the understanding of our interior life for Nietzsche, as well as a philosophical indicator of his theoretical adversaries. Finally, the end of this article attempts to show that certain positive indications for a different status of pain might serve as guiding lines for the uncovering of a Nietzschean theory of action. (shrink)

This book puts multilevel selection theory into a much needed historical perspective. This is achieved by discussing multilevel selection in the first half of the twentieth century, the reasons for the energetic rejection of Wynne-Edwards’ group selectionist stance in the 1960s, Elisabeth Lloyd’s contribution to the units of selection debate, Price’s hierarchical equation and its possible interpretations and, finally, species selection in macroevolutionary contexts. Another idea also seems to emerge from these studies; namely, that perhaps a more sure-footed position for (...) multilevel selection theory would be acquired if we were to show a renewed interest in 'old group selection', i.e. in scenarios in which the differential reproduction of the groups themselves affects the frequencies of either individual-level or group-level traits. This book will be of interest to philosophers and historians of biology, as well as to theoretically inclined biologists who have an interest in multilevel selection theory. (shrink)

This paper has a triple aim. First of all, it makes a comparison between Foucault’s notion of power relations and the notion of natural selection as it has been developed, since Darwin, by evolutionary biology. A number of common points between these two notions are analyzed here, such as acting on a spontaneity, facticity, fundamental visibility and global character. By analyzing these common points, this paper attempts – and this is its second aim – to indicate and criticize several preconceptions (...) about natural selection that still plague the comprehension, especially of non-specialists, of the notion of natural selection. Finally, by a thorough analysis of these common features, this article also attempts to indicate a point of radical divergence between these two notions, i.e. a central point that makes it impossible for the two notions to find a common application ground. (shrink)

This paper shows that Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative materialism doesn’t offer us the means to account for the ancestral statements that the modern sciences produce, i.e. for the scientific statements about events preceding all forms of life. An analysis of the reasons why Meillassoux thinks that the problem of ancestrality problematizes the contemporary self-evidence of correlationism is first offered. The results of this analysis are then applied to speculative materialism itself and the consequences are not very promising: very much like correlationism, (...) speculative materialism explicitly denies what I call the “generalized version of the realistic assumption of science” and, in so doing, renders scientific ancestral statements de jure unverifiable. Therefore, if correlationism is rendered suspicious by the issue of ancestrality, the same can be said of speculative materialism. (shrink)