Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles

In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer (2017)
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Abstract

Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.

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Geoff Keeling
Stanford University

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