Abstract

The inherent limitations of the traditional cognitive approach are illustrated by three predica-ments concerning planning, categorization, and transfer. Specifically, its central assumption that knowledge as a set of descriptions controls action is problematic because it cannot adequa-tely explicate the highly adaptable and dynamic human behavior. In its place, situated cogni-tion, with its tenet that cognitive activities entail ongoing interactive processes spanning body, brain, and environment, provides a cogent view that perceiving, knowing, and acting arise together in unison. This tripartite unit is sustained by self-regulating feedbacks from the biological and social systems of which the agent is a part. These arguments are derived from the four representative situated views, including Suchman's (1987) theory of situated action, Greeno's (1994) situativity theory, Resnick's (1994) situated rationalism, and Clancey's (1997) multimodal coordination theory. Historically, these theories can be traced back to the ideas of three scholars - Vygotsky's (1934/1986) cultural approach, Dewey's (1938/1986) experiential approach, and Gibson's (1979/1986) ecological approach. The main arguments of these seven theories are delineated. They unanimously claim that the relationship between knowledge and action is dialectical rather than causal. Conclusively, knowledge and action are not two sepa-rate psychological constructs, but they co-evolve as a coordinating unit. Thus, the gap between them can be dissolved. Two major consequences of the situated movement are identified: Theoretically, it has revived researchers' interest in the classical evolutionary theory; practical-ly, it has inspired the development of innovative instructional models. Finally, the outlook of situated cognition with particular attention focusing on its research agenda is discussed