Abstract

In Benet Perera’s De communibus, the question on the first object of the intellectual knowledge is not addressed as a particular topic. On the contrary, it does constitute the general background in which Perera tries to sketch an original theory of the knowledge. Starting from this premise, the following article aims to demonstrate how Perera’s quaestio de primo cognito can clarify, for its reader, the nature of the intellectual knowledge, the relationship between the intellectual knowledge and the sensible knowledge, and the ontology presupposed by this noetics.Through a detailed analysis of Perera’s arguments and of his claim that the first object of the intellect is the singular, the article focuses on some consequences of the solution proposed by the Spanish Jesuit. To this end, particular attention is given to Perera’s doctrine of the intellect and to the theoretical consequences of its formulation, in connection to the question of the relationship between sensible and intellectual knowledge