Free will as private determinism

Abstract

This article suggests that our sense of free will is formed when others react to our behavior with surprise, even though our private knowledge tells us our behavior was determined by our preferences. Such surprised reactions, even when our behavior is from our perspective fully determined, lead us to infer that we exercise free will.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Free will: a very short introduction.Thomas Pink - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
What the Consequence Argument Is an Argument For.Justin A. Capes - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):50-56.
The Idea of Will.M. M. Dorenbosch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 6 (7):449-472.
Freedom and Responsibility in Context.Ann Whittle - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-26

Downloads
391 (#53,581)

6 months
103 (#46,633)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references