Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth

Oxford University Press (2000)
Abstract
Identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are fundamental philosophical concerns. Colin McGinn treats them both philosophically and logically, aiming for maximum clarity and minimum pointless formalism. He contends that there are real logical properties that challenge naturalistic metaphysical outlooks. These concepts are not definable, though we can say a good deal about how they work. The aim of Logical Properties is to bring philosophy back to philosophical logic
Keywords Logic
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Reprint years 2003
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Call number BC71.M36 2000
ISBN(s) 0199241813   9780199241811     9780199262632
DOI 10.1093/mind/111.442.449
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Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Friederike Moltmann (2013). The Semantics of Existence. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (1):31-63.
Matti Eklund (2006). Metaontology. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.
Jamin Asay (2013). Primitive Truth. Dialectica 67 (4):503-519.

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