Abstract

The goal of this project is to bring into focus a philosophical discussion of akrasia which the history of ethical thought has overlooked, namely, that between Socrates and Aristotle. Put simply, to perform an act akratically is to do so believing that there is a better action open to perform. Socrates, somewhat astonishingly, denies that akratic actions ever occur, maintaining instead that all wrong action is solely the result of ignorance. What is lacking among the considerable literature devoted to Aristotle's account of akrasia is a study which takes full advantage of the view that his account is a negative reaction to Socrates' denial of akrasia. My project aims to fill this void. ;What I argue for is that most of the scholarship on Aristotle's account of akrasia is mistaken in treating it as being essentially Socratic, and that Aristotle is in fact presenting an account that tries to answer Socrates in an un-Socratic way. I do this by showing that--besides highlighting Aristotle's all-but-explicit announcement that he will answer Socrates--the standard interpretation of Aristotle's explanation of akrasia has him being far too Socratic to answer Socrates. In addition, the standard interpretation requires that Aristotle's own account of akrasia rely upon concepts which, by his own lights, are incompatible with one another. ;Instead, I maintain, Aristotle's explanation of akrasia is far closer to the sort of explanation that Plato gives in Republic, Book IV, involving the claim that there exist "parts of the soul" which separately house the person's rational and irrational desires. A parts-of-the-soul position, if sound, is a far stronger answer to Socrates, I maintain, than is the standard, two syllogisms approach. One reason for this is because, as I argue, such an explanation never occurred to Socrates to give. Nevertheless, I conclude, Socrates would have been able to argue against such an explanation from Socratic principles