Abstract
The history of natural philosophy is something of a no-man’s land between the history of philosophy on one side and the history of science on the other. This situation derives in part from the fact that natural philosophy itself is unpopular among both philosophers and scientists. Nevertheless, the historiographical situation is rather lamentable since the sharp science/ philosophy distinction did not emerge until relatively recent historical times and since the historical sensibility requires one to respect the beliefs of the historical agents. The present book—a translation from the 1968 La philosophie naturelle de Galilée—is to be welcomed insofar as it helps to correct this lamentable situation. It does so by means of a long discussion of the Aristotelian and medieval doctrines of motion which concludes that Aristotle, the medievals, and Galileo can all be seen to be trying to solve the same basic problem in natural philosophy. It would be difficult, after Clavelin’s book, to maintain, for example, that Aristotle’s problem was the philosophical or metaphysical problem of motion, whereas Galileo’s was the scientific problem. There is a continuity of the basic problem, as regards motion, from Aristotle to Galileo which is not to be confused either with a continuity of particular subsidiary problems or with a continuity of solutions. Clavelin is at pains to point out and emphasize the originality of Galileo’s contribution, as stemming from the novelty of his particular subsidiary problems and of his solutions. In fact, the reason that Clavelin himself gives for beginning the book with a long discussion of the pre-Galilean doctrines of motion is that he wants better to explain and justify that originality.