The Theory of the Division of Labor in Classical Political Economy: An Aristotelian Critique
Dissertation, Yale University (
1990)
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Abstract
I use the theory of the division of labor as a case-study in the logic of social explanation and to test the explanatory power of a new Aristotelian model for social theory. The classical political economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx argue that the divisions of labor is both efficient and natural. I claim that this explanation suffers from a two-fold reductionism: the moral dimension of the division of labor is reduced to technical efficiency; and the customary and stipulated dimensions of the division of labor are reduced to nature. This reductionism collapses two important Aristotelian distinctions: that between moral reason and technical reason ; and that between nature , custom , and deliberate stipulation . I revise these concepts in the light of modern natural, social and philosophical sciences into a framework for social theory: I show that, in human conduct, technical reason always presupposes moral reason; and I show that every social institution is the joint product of nature, custom, and stipulation: just as custom presupposes nature, so stipulation presupposes custom. I then use this framework to criticize Aristotle as well as classical political economy. By transcending the positivist dichotomy of ends and means, I restore moral reason to supremacy over technique. By transcending the Sophistic dichotomy between nature and convention, I restore custom to its rightful place at the center of social theory