Abstract

The institutions of the one-person head of state and the specialized body of constitutional control are quite new for the CIS countries, however, the CIS states have shown a rather wide variety of approaches in the regulation of these institutions. Analysis of the interaction between the head of state and specialized bodies of constitutional control on the basis of a comparative law research method is interesting both for the purpose of better understanding the features of the functioning of institutions that are relatively new for the CIS countries, and in order to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the principle of separation of powers, which has received normative regulation in the constitutions of absolutely all of the CIS states. The author consistently examines the procedure for the formation of a specialized body of constitutional control, the procedure for early termination of the powers of its members in order to identify the degree of influence of the head of state on these processes, and also analyzes the control powers of a specialized body of constitutional control exercised in relation to the head of state or in relation to other bodies state power at the initiative of the head of state. Based on the results of the analysis, the article concludes that there is an extremely high degree of dependence of a specialized body of constitutional control on the head of state, who already has a privileged position in the system of separation of powers, in a number of CIS countries.